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Articles 
INSTITUTIONAL LIABILITY FOR EMPLOYEES’ 
INTENTIONAL TORTS:  VICARIOUS 
LIABILITY AS A QUASI-SUBSTITUTE FOR 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
Catherine M. Sharkey* 
Abstract 
Modern day vicarious liability cases often address the liability of enterprises 
and institutions whose agents have committed intentional acts.  Increasingly, 
when employers are sued, the line is blurred between the principal’s vicarious 
liability for its agent’s acts and its own direct liability for hiring and/or failing to 
supervise or control its agent. 
From an economic deterrence perspective, the imposition of vicarious liability 
induces employers to adopt cost-justified preventative measures, including 
selective hiring and more stringent supervision and discipline, and, in some 
instances, to truncate the scope of their business activities.  Negligence-based 
direct liability likewise induces employers to adopt cost-justified preventative 
measures (without constraining activity levels to the degree that strict liability 
does).  This raises questions.  Why doesn’t direct employer negligence liability 
suffice, in terms of deterring employees’ intentional torts?  Or conversely, so long 
as there is vicarious liability, is there any need for direct negligence liability at 
all? 
In this Article, I argue that, as a form of strict liability, vicarious liability will 
have an edge over direct employer negligence liability to the extent that there is a 
significant risk of under-detection of the failures of an employer’s preventative 
measures.  Traces of this under-detection rationale for vicarious liability can be 
found in the academic literature and court decisions, but it warrants further 
elaboration.  The risk of under-detection provides a strong justification for the 
expansion of the scope of institutional or employer vicarious liability. 
The under-detection rationale, moreover, has the potential to serve as a 
coherent framework for some modern doctrinal debates, including whether 
punitive damages should be imposed either vicariously or directly upon employers 
                                                
* Crystal Eastman Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.  This Article is 
adapted from the 2018 Monsanto Lecture, which I delivered at Valparaiso University Law 
on April 12, 2018.  I presented earlier versions of this Article at the Berlin Wissenschaftskolleg 
Institute for Advanced Studies Seminar, Haifa University Faculty Workshop, Tel Aviv 
University Private Law Workshop, and the German-American Lawyers’ Association (DAJV) 
Lecture at Freiburg University.  I am grateful for comments from workshop participants, 
especially Ronen Perry, Ariel Porat, and Gerhard Wagner, and for research assistance from 
Caleb Seeley (NYU 2017) and Meghan Racklin (NYU 2019). 
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when their employees commit intentional torts.  Specifically, I argue that the 
under-detection rationale correspondingly strengthens the case for punitive 
damages in direct negligence cases and weakens the case for punitive damages 
imposed in vicarious liability cases.  Focusing on under-detection, vicarious 
liability acts as a quasi-substitute for punitive damages.  And seen through this 
lens, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 909, Punitive Damages Against a 
Principal—typically defended as a “complicity rule” limiting the imposition of 
vicarious punitive liability on fairness grounds—is justified on economic 
deterrence grounds by allowing punitive damages coupled with direct negligence 
liability but limiting its operation in the vicarious liability sphere. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Vicarious liability of employers for employees’ torts can be justified 
on economic deterrence grounds—namely, identifying the “cheapest cost 
avoider” to hold liable for the tortious conduct.  The economic approach 
emphasizes both the ability of the employer to induce careful conduct by 
its employees and the potential that judgment-proof employees might 
escape direct personal liability.  The conventional economic accounts 
compare vicarious liability of the employer (or principal) with direct 
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liability of the (typically) negligent employee (or agent).1  But these 
conventional accounts do not address an emerging paradigm of 
institutional liability confronting the courts. 
Modern day vicarious liability cases often address the liability of 
enterprises and institutions (such as churches, schools, and residential 
homes) in a context in which their agents have committed intentional acts.  
Increasingly, when an employer is sued, the line is blurred between the 
principal’s vicarious liability and its own direct liability.  My Article 
focuses exclusively on employer liability for employees’ intentional torts 
and, in that context, compares vicarious liability with direct liability 
against the employer using an optimal deterrence framework. 
The imposition of strict liability vicarious liability (“strict-vicarious 
liability”) induces employers to adopt cost-justified preventative 
measures—including selective hiring and more stringent supervision and 
discipline of its employees—and, in some instances, to truncate the scope 
of their business activities.  But there is a serious potential downside:  
when there is nothing the employer reasonably could have done to 
prevent an employee’s tort—as may often be the case with intentional 
torts—then the imposition of strict liability has no benefit from a 
deterrence perspective and simply creates expensive lawsuits. 
Negligence-based direct liability likewise induces employers to adopt 
cost-justified preventative measures (without constraining activity levels 
to the degree that strict liability does).  This raises questions.  Why doesn’t 
direct employer negligence liability suffice in terms of deterring the 
commission of intentional torts by employees?  Or, conversely, so long as 
there is strict-vicarious liability, is there any need for direct negligence 
liability at all? 
“Scope of employment” stands as a doctrinal dividing line between 
the two approaches.  The requirement that an employee act within the 
“scope of employment” to hold the employer strictly vicariously liable for 
the employee’s torts is well established and, more than any other factor, 
determines whether a court applies strict or negligence-based liability 
against the employer.2  But does it mark a logical and/or efficient 
boundary between the imposition of direct negligence and strict-vicarious 
liability?  The conventional economic account has justified the “scope of 
employment” limitation as a proxy for enterprise causation. 
                                                
1 See infra Part II (discussing the conventional economic account of employer’s vicarious 
liability, factoring in the employee’s inability to pay, the employer’s control over the 
employee’s actions, and enterprise causation). 
2 See infra Part III (looking at employer vicarious liability as whether or not the employee 
was acting within the scope of the employment). 
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But, apart from the strength of the causal nexus (which in some form 
must be satisfied for both strict liability and negligence-based liability), 
what justifies the choice between direct negligence and strict-vicarious 
liability against the employer?  In this Article, I highlight as a significant 
factor the likelihood of detection of the failures of an employer’s 
preventative measures.3  To the extent that there is a significant risk of 
under-detection of the failures of an employer’s preventative measures, 
strict-vicarious liability has an edge over direct employer negligence 
liability in terms of optimal deterrence.  Traces of this under-detection 
rationale for vicarious liability can be found in the academic literature as 
well as court decisions, but it warrants further elaboration.   
The under-detection rationale has the potential, moreover, to serve as 
a coherent framework for the significant modern doctrinal debates 
regarding whether punitive damages should be imposed either 
vicariously or directly upon employers for intentional torts committed by 
their employees.  Focusing on under-detection, vicarious liability acts as a 
quasi-substitute for punitive damages.4  Seen through this lens, several 
significant implications follow.  The case for punitive damages on top of 
direct negligence actions emerges strong, whereas the case for vicarious 
punitive damages is comparatively weaker.  I introduce a novel burden-
shifting and information-forcing approach into this context to strike the 
right balance, allowing defendants facing strict-vicarious liability to 
immunize themselves against a direct negligence claim—and thereby 
punitive damages—by showing that suitable preventative measures are 
in place.5  Finally, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 909, Punitive Damages 
Against a Principal (“Restatement § 909”)—typically defended as a 
“complicity rule” limiting the imposition of vicarious punitive liability on 
fairness grounds—is justified on economic deterrence grounds by 
allowing punitive damages coupled with direct negligence liability but 
limiting its operation in the vicarious liability sphere.6 
                                                
3 See infra Part IV.A. 
4 See infra Part IV. 
5 See infra Section IV.B.3 (discussing this burden-shifting approach). 
6 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 (AM. LAW INST. 1979).  See infra Section IV.B.4 
(analyzing the Restatement’s “complicity rule” alongside the newly proposed burden-shifting 
approach). 
Sharkey: Institutional Liability for Employees’ Intentional Torts: Vicario
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press,
6 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53 
II.  CONVENTIONAL ECONOMIC ACCOUNT OF EMPLOYER VICARIOUS 
LIABILITY 
In two seminal articles, Alan Sykes sets forth the classic economic 
argument for employer vicarious liability.7  In this Part, I summarize the 
solid underlying theory and more limited doctrinal application of Sykes’s 
framework.  While this will serve as a necessary foundation, I emphasize 
at the outset that the issues I explore in this Article fall largely outside of 
Sykes’s core interest in pitting employer vicarious liability against 
employee personal liability, primarily in the context of negligence actions. 
In his 1984 article, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, Sykes “inquires 
whether a rule of vicarious liability, under which the principal and agent 
are jointly and severally liable for the agent’s wrongs, is economically 
efficient relative to a rule of personal liability, under which the agent alone 
is liable for his wrongs.”8  Sykes explicitly does not consider “rules that 
impose liability on principals for agent wrongs that are attributable to the 
principals’ own malfeasance.”9  Sykes reiterates in his 1988 article, The 
Boundaries of Vicarious Liability:  An Economic Analysis of the Scope of 
Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, that “[t]he analysis 
throughout . . . contemplates the choice between a rule of personal 
liability, under which the employee alone is liable for his wrongs, and a 
rule of vicarious liability, under which the employer and employee are 
jointly and severally liable.”10 
The classic economic justification for employer vicarious liability rests 
on three pillars:  (1) employee inability to pay; (2) employer control 
methods; and (3) enterprise causation.11  First, Sykes’s framework 
emphasizes that “the choice between vicarious liability and personal 
liability is a significant one whenever the employee is unable to pay 
                                                
7 See Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231 (1984) 
[hereinafter Sykes, Economics] (discussing the economics related to vicarious liability in 
employment relationships); Alan O. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability:  An Economic 
Analysis of the Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563 
(1988) [hereinafter Sykes, Boundaries] (defining vicarious liability and how it relates to 
employees and employers in the workplace). 
8 Sykes, Economics, supra note 7, at 1231–32 (footnotes omitted). 
9 Id. at 1231 n.2.  Sykes explained, “Rather, the Article deals with situations in which the 
principal does not contribute to the wrong except, perhaps, by his failure to monitor the 
agent or to design incentives that deter agent malfeasance.”  Id.  But this caveat flags what I 
take up in this Article—whether actions such as the employer’s failure to monitor or detect 
employee misconduct warrants the imposition of direct negligence liability and, if so, 
whether that alters the soundness of the imposition of vicarious liability. 
10 Sykes, Boundaries, supra note 7, at 564. 
11 See id. at 569, 581–82 (describing supporting economic factors for vicarious liability as 
the employee’s inability to pay judgments, the employer’s control methods over 
employment, and enterprise causation). 
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judgments in full under a rule of personal liability.”12  Second, the 
efficiency of vicarious liability rests not only on the potentially diminished 
incentives for judgment-proof employees to take adequate care but also 
on the potential for employers to be the cheapest cost avoiders in terms of 
taking cost-effective measures to induce their employees to take adequate 
care.13  Third, Sykes’s seminal contribution is his elaboration of “enterprise 
causation”—an employer “causes” its employees’ torts to the extent that 
the probability of the employee committing the tort is increased due to the 
employment relationship.14 
A. Employee Inability to Pay 
Sykes’s cost internalization framework starts with the Coasean insight 
that, absent transaction costs, the optimal allocation of risk “does not 
depend upon where the law initially places liability.”15  However, if the 
employee tortfeasor’s assets are less than the potential judgment against 
him, the choice between employee personal liability and employer 
vicarious liability becomes significant.16 
Given that employees and employers internalize future expected 
costs, where an employee may be (wholly or partially) judgment-proof, 
personal liability creates three inefficiencies:  (1) the employee’s incentive 
to avoid committing torts is suboptimal, given that he or she will not pay 
for the full consequences of his or her actions; (2) the employer’s 
profitability is inflated, as it need not expend resources to monitor 
employees to minimize the risk of their committing torts (and indeed, 
some of the employees’ torts may in fact serve the employer’s bottom line); 
and (3) employees may be dissuaded from entering optimal risk-
allocation agreements with their employers.17  The imposition of vicarious 
liability upon the employer is presented as a solution that avoids the 
“inefficient expansion of the scale of business activity that results when 
the employee cannot pay judgments, . . . improve[s] the efficiency of risk-
sharing by eliminating the incentive . . . to take advantage of [the 
employee’s] inability to pay,” and eliminates transaction costs incurred in 
negotiating private agreements for the employer to assume liability.18 
                                                
12 Id. at 566. 
13 See id. at 591–92 (detailing the control that employers must have over their employees 
and how this control can be a cost-effective measure to induce employees to act with care in 
the workplace). 
14 See id. at 571 (defining enterprise causation). 
15 Id. at 566. 
16 See Sykes, Boundaries, supra note 7, at 566 (emphasizing that vicarious liability accounts 
for judgments for plaintiff that may exceed the employee’s assets). 
17 See id. at 567–68. 
18 Id. at 568.  
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B. Employer Control 
The economic efficiency view of vicarious liability depends on “its 
effect upon employees’ incentives to avoid wrongful conduct” where 
“[t]he effect of vicarious liability on such incentives depends in turn upon 
the devices available to the employer to induce careful behavior and the 
costs of those devices.”19 
Sykes sets forth the various ways in which employers can exercise 
such control.  First, employers can directly observe their employees’ 
activities and announce a desired standard of conduct.20  Second, 
employers can structure compensation and promotion decisions to 
incentivize employees over the course of a long-term relationship.21  
Finally, in situations in which an employee, whose conduct is 
unobservable, is engaged only in a short-term relationship, an employer’s 
“threat of an indemnity action against the employee” may be the only 
device available to dissuade misconduct.22 
The Restatement (Third) of Agency provides a “control test” to 
determine the scope of employer vicarious liability for “its employee 
acting within the scope of employment.”23  The Restatement justifies the 
control test on economic grounds, stating that where an employee’s tort 
was not within the scope of activity controllable by the employer, 
employer liability would not incentivize the employer to take steps to 
prevent such conduct, and an employer could not reasonably insure 
against risks that it cannot ascertain or quantify.24  Overall, Sykes argues 
that the criteria are in line with the factors that determine the efficiency of 
vicarious liability—observability and the costs to the principal of 
monitoring loss-avoidance efforts.25 
                                                
19 Id. at 569. 
20 See id. (noting direct observation as an inexpensive device available for employers). 
21 See id. at 570 (discussing employer influence over pay and advancement as another 
inexpensive incentive available for employers). 
22 Sykes, Boundaries, supra note 7, at 570. 
23 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“An employer is 
subject to vicarious liability for a tort committed by its employee acting within the scope of 
employment.”); id. § 7.07(2) (“[A]n employee acts within the scope of employment when 
performing work assigned by the employer or engaging in a course of conduct subject to the 
employer’s control.” (emphasis added)).  By contrast, “[w]hen an agent is not an employee, the 
principal lacks the right to control the manner and means of the agent’s physical conduct in 
how work is performed.”  Id. § 7.07 cmt. b. 
24 See id. § 7.07 note b (justifying vicarious liability when the employer has a degree of 
control over the employee’s actions). 
25 See Sykes, Economics, supra note 7, at 1262 (discussing observability and costs of 
monitoring loss-avoidance). 
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C. Enterprise Causation 
The most innovative feature of Sykes’s framework is his elaboration 
of the notion of enterprise causation to forge the link between an 
employer’s business activity and its employees’ torts:  “An enterprise 
‘fully causes’ the wrong of an employee if the dissolution of the enterprise 
and subsequent unemployment of the employee would reduce the 
probability of the wrong to zero.”26  And vicarious liability “will [thus] 
force the enterprise to bear a greater proportion of the cost of the accidents 
that it ‘causes.’”27 
Applying Sykes’s notion of enterprise causation ensures that each 
business “bears the incremental social costs associated with its 
operation.”28  Furthermore, it demonstrates the inefficiency of holding an 
employer vicariously liable for all employee torts even when the employer 
cannot affect either the likelihood that the employee commits a tort or the 
likely amount of damages.29  Thus, where the enterprise is fully 
responsible for the harm, it “will operate at an efficient level of output only 
if it bears, directly or indirectly, all liability for the employee’s [tort].”30  
Whereas, where “[t]he probability of a [tort] thus depends upon whether 
the employee is employed or not, but (by hypothesis) cannot be affected 
by the employer once the employee has been hired,” it is inefficient to 
impose either the full value of the tort or no liability on the enterprise.31 
III.  EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR EMPLOYEE INTENTIONAL TORTS: 
“SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT” AS A DIVIDING LINE 
We turn now from the conventional economic account—with 
employer vicarious liability pitted against employee personal liability, 
primarily in the context of employee negligence torts—to my main focus, 
namely comparing and contrasting different forms of employer liability in 
the context of employee intentional torts.32  Moreover, I begin with an 
exposition of the doctrine of “scope of employment” as it has emerged as 
                                                
26 Sykes, Boundaries, supra note 7, at 572. 
27 Id. at 584.  Sykes thus departs from the Restatement (Third) Agency, which specifically 
rejects a “foreseeability” test and any tests that look to whether the fact of employment 
“increased the [likelihood] that the tort would occur.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY 
§ 7.07 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
28 Sykes, Boundaries, supra note 7, at 573. 
29 See id. at 573–75 (pointing out that vicarious liability for all employee torts may be 
inefficient). 
30 Id. at 576. 
31 Id. at 575. 
32 See, e.g., infra Part III.A (targeting vicarious liability); infra Part III.B (focusing on direct 
negligence). 
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a dividing line between employer vicarious liability and direct negligence 
liability in the context of employee intentional torts before proceeding to 
offer a theoretical criticism and posit an alternative approach. 
The “scope of employment” doctrine has emerged as a sharp dividing 
line separating vicarious employer liability from direct negligence liability 
for employee intentional torts in a significant number of jurisdictions.33  
Employers can be held vicariously liable for employees who commit 
intentional torts while acting within the scope of employment, whereas 
employers can be held directly liable for their own negligence in situations 
in which employees commit intentional torts outside the scope of 
employment.  For example, “New Jersey would not permit Plaintiff to 
proceed on her claim of negligent hiring, training, supervision, and 
retention in light of Defendants’ admission that [the employee] was acting 
within the course and scope of his employment.”34  And in Florida, courts 
                                                
33 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.05 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (noting 
that jurisdictions differ as to whether direct negligence theories can be applied where the 
employee acted within the scope of employment and that, in some jurisdictions, punitive 
damages may be appropriate on one theory but not the other). 
 Indeed, the doctrinal confusion goes even deeper.  There are myriad examples of courts 
that have altogether confused the requirements and purposes of vicarious liability with 
direct liability.  See, e.g., Bishop v. Miller, Nos. 4-97-30, 4-97-31, 1998 WL 135802, at *3 (Ohio 
Ct. App. Mar. 26, 1998) (dismissing a claim of negligent supervision on the ground that the 
alleged sexual battery was “not within the scope of [defendant’s] employment” as is required 
for respondeat superior); Cook v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 725, 732 (D. Minn. 
1994) (“[U]nder the rubric of negligent supervision, in order to successfully state a claim 
against an employer, the claimant must establish that the employee who caused an injury 
did so within the scope of his or her employment.”).  See generally Paula Dalley, Destroying 
the Scope of Employment, 55 WASHBURN L.J. 637 (2016) (discussing the technical errors courts 
make in deciding employer liability cases). 
 I am not taking on this even “lower hanging fruit” doctrinal confusion for two reasons.  
First, it is not theoretically very interesting (although may nonetheless be important to 
correct, given the stakes of these cases).  Second, it does not appear to be as widespread an 
issue, in part given ample evidence that appellate courts often correct trial courts that make 
this mistake.  See, e.g., Doe v. Borromeo, No. 305162, 2012 WL 4215032, at *4–5 (Mich. Ct. 
App. Sept. 20, 2012) (remanding a case to trial court for failing to address plaintiff’s negligent 
supervision claim and only addressing vicarious liability); Minnis v. Or. Mut. Ins. Co., 48 
P.3d 137, 144 (Or. 2002) (noting the danger of confusion); Byrd v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584, 588–
89 (Ohio 1991) (pointing out that the appellate court had conflated negligent hiring and 
respondeat superior). 
34 Lee ex rel. Estate of Lee v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 308 F. Supp. 2d 310, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004).  See also id. at 313 (“Although New Jersey has indeed recognized the tort of negligent 
hiring/retention, its rationale for doing so appears to rest upon a ‘concern for the safety and 
welfare of the general public, and the need to assess liability for the vicious acts of employees, 
in the absence of respondeat superior liability.’” (quoting 18 N.J. PRAC. EMPLOYMENT LAW § 12.34 
(West 1998))); Bennett v. T & F Distrib. Co., 285 A.2d 59, 60 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1971) 
(“If [the employee] had been acting within the scope of employment when he assaulted [the 
customer], it would be immaterial whether [the employer] was negligent in hiring [the 
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have likewise restricted employer direct liability claims to realms in which 
the employee commits an intentional tort while acting outside the scope 
of employment.35  Thus, “Florida law requires that a claim for negligent 
retention allege acts committed outside the course and scope of 
employment.”36 
Moreover, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 317, Duty of Master to Control 
Conduct of Servant (“Restatement § 317”) seems to embrace this approach as 
well.37  Restatement § 317 provides that “[a] master is under a duty to 
exercise reasonable care so to control his servant while acting outside the 
scope of his employment as to prevent him from intentionally harming 
others . . . .”38  Indeed, the commentary clarifies that “[t]he rule stated in 
this Section is applicable only when the servant is acting outside the scope 
of his employment.  If the servant is acting within the scope of his 
employment, the master may be vicariously liable under the principles of 
the law of Agency.”39 
Significant practical implications flow from scope of employment 
forging a doctrinal dividing line between vicarious and direct employer 
liability.  First, an employer might have a strategic reason to concede that 
an employee’s intentional tort falls within the “scope of employment” so 
as to foreclose a direct liability claim, especially if the latter is either the 
sole or probable route to recovering punitive damages.40 
Second, the division has implications for the type of evidence that can 
be admitted to support the claim.  The South Carolina Supreme Court, for 
example, acknowledged: 
                                                
employee], for in such instance [the employer] would be liable on the theory of respondeat 
superior.”), cert. denied, 289 A.2d 795 (N.J. 1972). 
35  See, e.g., Belizaire v. Miami, 944 F. Supp. 2d 1204, 1214 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (emphasizing that 
direct liability can only be applied to employers when the employee commits an intentional 
tort outside the scope of employment). 
36  Id. at 1215.  Defendant’s motion to dismiss a negligent retention claim was granted on 
the grounds that “the officers here were acting within the scope of their employment.”  Id. 
37 Note, however, that such an interpretation of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 317 is in 
tension with Restatement (Second) of Agency § 213 cmt. h (“In a given case the employer may 
be liable both on the ground that he was personally negligent and on the ground that the 
conduct was within the scope of employment.”), and Restatement (Third) of Agency § 7.07 cmt. 
b (explaining that an employer, even when not in control of an employee’s actions, may be 
liable via direct negligence or fault theories).  See, e.g., Pruitt v. Pavelin, 685 P.2d 1347, 1359–
60 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984) (awarding compensatory and punitive damages on a scope-of-
employment theory and compensatory damages on a negligent hiring theory). 
38 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (emphasis added). 
39 Id. § 317 cmt. a. 
40 Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 213 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 1958) (noting that 
in “cases [where the employer is liable on direct negligence and vicarious liability theories], 
the fact that the employer was personally negligent may be important, however, in 
jurisdictions in which punitive damages are awarded”). 
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[T]he admission of evidence which must be offered to 
prove a negligent hiring, training, supervision, or 
entrustment claim—evidence such as a prior driving 
record, an arrest record, or other records of past mishaps 
or misbehavior by the employee—will be highly 
prejudicial if combined with a stipulation by the 
employer that it will ultimately be vicariously liable for 
the employee’s . . . acts.41 
But the court nonetheless concluded: 
[T]he argument that the court must entirely preclude a 
cause of action to protect the jury from considering 
prejudicial evidence gives impermissibly short-shrift to 
the trial court’s ability to judge the admission of evidence 
and to protect the integrity of trial, and to the jury’s ability 
to follow the trial court’s instructions.42 
Should an employer’s direct negligence liability thus be reserved only 
for situations in which an employee’s intentional tort falls outside the 
scope of employment?  To the extent courts expand the realm of “scope of 
employment” for employee intentional torts, should they concomitantly 
limit the range for direct negligence-based liability? 
A. Vicarious Liability for Intentional Torts “Within the Scope of Employment” 
Courts are, by and large, willing to consider imposing vicarious 
liability on employers for employees’ intentional torts so long as they are 
acting “within the scope of employment.”43  But to date, courts have 
typically construed “within the scope of employment” extremely 
narrowly in the context of employee intentional torts—primarily only 
those actions employees take in the service of their employer’s purposes, 
typically where they have acted with apparent or actual authorization by 
their employer. 
                                                
41 James v. Kelly Trucking Co., 661 S.E.2d 329, 331 (S.C. 2008). 
42 Id.  Nor was the court satisfied with the rule coupled with a “punitive damages 
exception”—as this would lead to a rule of “little utility” or else force a judgment regarding 
the employer’s conduct by the court based only on the pleadings.  Id. at 332. 
43  See, e.g., Blair v. Def. Servs., 386 F.3d 623, 627–28 (4th Cir. 2004) (finding intentional torts 
are not always outside the scope of employment under vicarious liability in Virginia, but 
employee’s intentional actions fell outside scope of employment); Doe v. Samaritan 
Counseling Ctr., 791 P.2d 344, 347 (Alaska 1990) (imposing vicarious liability on an employer 
for an employee’s intentional tort “within the scope of employment”). 
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The classic Ira Bushey & Sons case and one of its progeny, Taber v. 
Maine, are the exceptions that prove the rule.44  Two visionary Second 
Circuit judges (applying the law of admiralty and Guam/California, 
respectively), Henry Friendly and Guido Calabresi, articulated a much 
broader rationale for a military employer’s vicarious liability for its 
serviceman employee’s intentional tort, based on economic theories of 
enterprise causation and employer control.45 
                                                
44 Ira Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968); Taber v. Maine, 67 
F.3d 1029 (2d Cir. 1995). For cases citing Ira Bushey but nonetheless adopting the “motive 
test,” see Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Ctr., 791 P.2d 344, 347–48 (Alaska 1990) (holding, in 
the context of a therapist’s abuse of a patient, that the employer could be vicariously liable, 
given that “where tortious conduct arises out of and is reasonably incidental to the 
employee’s legitimate work activities, the ‘motivation to serve’ test will have been satisfied”); 
Sharkey v. Lasmo, 992 F. Supp. 321, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (“[I]n order to be within the scope of 
employment, the tort must have been committed in part to benefit the employer and the 
employer must have received some benefit. . . . [A]s the Court of Appeals has recognized [in 
Ira Bushey], ‘courts have gone to considerable lengths to find such a purpose.’” (citations 
omitted)); U.S. v. Davis, 666 F. Supp. 641, 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (“Under the doctrine of 
respondeat superior an employer can be held vicariously liable for damages caused by its 
employees when the employee was acting within the scope of employment [as per Ira 
Bushey]. An employee acts within the scope of employment when he or she furthers the 
employer’s interest.”); Dashner v. Hamburg Ctr. Dep’t Pub. Welfare, 62 Pa. D. & C.4th 380, 
387 (Pa. C.P. Berks July 7, 2003) (“[A] claim for vicarious liability cannot stand where a 
servant’s intentional torts are actuated by personal motives only and are not in furtherance 
of the interests of his employer.”); Avery v. United States, 434 F. Supp. 937, 942 (D. Conn. 
1977) (“[T]he relevant question is whether the employee acted from a personal motive or 
with a motivation to serve his employer’s interests.”). 
For cases rejecting Ira Bushey outright, see Patterson v. Blair, 172 S.W.3d 361, 371–72 
(Ky. 2005) (rejecting Ira Bushey); Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1043 n.32 (Utah 
1991) (declining to apply the “premises rule” from Ira Bushey); Kuehn v. White, 600 P.2d 679, 
683 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (noting that if vicarious liability is to be expanded, it should come 
from the legislature); Pickering v. Daniel J. Keating Co., 460 F.2d 820, 823 n.7 (3d Cir. 1972) 
(finding no Ira Bushey-style expansion of vicarious liability under New Jersey law); Sandman 
v. Hagan, 154 N.W. 2d 113, 118–19 (Iowa 1967) (“If employer [vicarious] liability is to be 
extended [as in Ira Bushey], we believe it should come from the legislature . . . .”). 
The U.S. Supreme Court, citing Ira Bushey, recognized that “[t]he concept of scope of 
employment has not always been construed to require a motive to serve the employer,” but 
nonetheless rejected this approach under Title VII sexual harassment.  See Burlington Indus., 
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 757 (1998) (“The general rule is that sexual harassment by a 
supervisor is not conduct within the scope of employment.”).  See also Faragher v. Boca 
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 793–802 (1998) (describing the factors involved in determining liability 
for torts committed by employees outside the scope of their employment). 
45 See Ira Bushey, 398 F.2d at 170 (finding that the motive analysis was not the proper test 
for imposing vicarious liability on the employer in this case); Taber v. Maine, 67 F.3d 1029, 
1031 (2d Cir. 1995) (“California has taken the lead in developing the modern law of respondeat 
superior even before Bushey. And, so, rounding out the circle, we now reach the same 
conclusion as did Judge Friendly, twenty-six years ago.”).  
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1. Narrow Recognition by Courts 
Most jurisdictions hold that employee intentional torts can only be 
considered within the scope of employment under extremely limited 
circumstances.  As one court aptly summed up, “As a general rule, it is 
not within the scope of an employee’s employment to commit an assault 
upon a third person.”46  
The majority position is that intentional torts are only within the scope 
of employment when committed to serve the employer’s interest, namely: 
the act is one which is “fairly and naturally incident to the 
business,” and is done “while the servant was engaged 
upon the master’s business and [is] done, although 
mistakenly or ill advisedly, with a view to further the 
master’s interest, or from some impulse of emotion which 
naturally grew out of or was incident to the attempt to 
perform the master’s business.”47 
By contrast, courts have held that “[w]hen ‘an assault is purely personal 
to the servant, having no real connection with the master’s business, the 
doctrine of respondeat superior is inapplicable to fasten liability upon the 
master.’”48  Jurisdictions often cabin vicarious liability in this manner by 
deploying the actual or apparent agency doctrine: 
To recover under a theory of vicarious liability such as 
actual or apparent agency, it must be shown that the 
agent or apparent agent’s conduct was motivated, at least 
in part, by the purpose of serving the employer.  It is 
entirely clear that responsibility for the intentional 
wrongful acts of a servant-employee may be visited upon 
his master-employer under the doctrine of respondeat 
superior only when that conduct in some way furthers the 
interests of the master or is at least motivated by a 
                                                
46 Rodebush ex rel. Rodebush v. Okla. Nursing Homes, Ltd., 867 P.2d 1241, 1245 (Okla. 
1993). 
47 Id. 
48 Ayers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 941 F. Supp. 1163, 1169 (M.D. Fla. 1996).  Moreover, 
courts reach mixed conclusions on whether to recognize respondeat superior in the hybrid 
situation in which “an employee commits an intentional tort with the dual purpose of 
furthering the employer’s interest and venting personal anger.” Sunseri v. Puccia, 422 N.E.2d 
925, 930 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981). 
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purpose to serve those interests, rather than the 
employee’s own.49 
2. Whither Enterprise Causation Rationale? 
In the context of employee intentional torts, courts seem especially 
wary of the imposition of vicarious employer liability.  As described 
above, courts typically recognize vicarious liability only in the more 
limited situations in which the employee acts to serve the employer’s 
purposes under some variant of actual or apparent authority.  But this 
essentially transforms vicarious liability into a form of direct liability 
(which would apply in situations in which the employer authorized the 
employee’s act).  In any event, it is a far cry from Sykes’s notion of 
enterprise causation. 
Against this backdrop, two cases stand out in terms of their 
endorsement (implicit and explicit, respectively) of the enterprise 
causation rationale.50  The first is the classic case Ira Bushey & Sons v. United 
                                                
49 Ayers, 941 F. Supp. at 1169. 
50 The Second Circuit appears to be a hotbed for the enterprise causation rationale for 
vicarious liability.  See Cronin v. Hertz Corp., 818 F.2d 1064, 1067–69 (2d Cir. 1987) (adopting 
the Ira Bushey approach in a case applying Connecticut law).  New York state and federal 
courts cite Ira Bushey frequently.  See, e.g., Riviello v. Waldron, 391 N.E.2d 1278, 1281 (N.Y. 
1979) (“Among the factors to be weighed are:  [1] the connection between the time, place and 
occasion for the act; [2] the history of the relationship between employer and employee as 
spelled out in actual practice; [3] whether the act is one commonly done by such an employee; 
[4] the extent of departure from normal methods of performance; [5] and whether the specific 
act was one that the employer could reasonably have anticipated.” (citing Ira Bushey)).  
 The Ira Bushey case and enterprise causation rationale also resonates in the Seventh 
Circuit.  See, e.g., Wilson v. Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 841 F.2d 1347, 1353–56 
& n.2 (7th Cir. 1988) (directing “the factfinder to determine if ‘(a) the tort arose during an 
errand of the sort that probably would not have occurred absent the existence of the 
employment relationship, or (b) for some other reason, the probability of the tort was 
substantially increased by the existence of the employment relationship” (quoting Sykes, 
Boundaries, supra note 7, at 587)); Horn v. Duke Homes, Div. of Windsor Mobile Homes, Inc., 
755 F.2d 599, 605 (7th Cir. 1985) (“The reasoning behind this rule [of vicarious liability] is 
rarely articulated, though the more modern cases tend to rely on a risk allocation theory:  the 
employer, not the innocent plaintiff, should bear the cost of the torts of its employees as a 
required cost of doing business, insofar as such torts are reasonably foreseeable and the 
employer is a more efficient cost avoider than the injured plaintiff.” (citations omitted)). 
 It has also been embraced in a few additional jurisdictions.  See, e.g., Leafgreen v. Am. 
Family Mut. Ins. Co., 393 N.W.2d 275, 280–81 (S.D. 1986) (adopting a modified foreseeability 
test wherein “foreseeable” means that “the employee’s conduct must not be so unusual or 
startling that it would be unfair to include the loss caused by the injury among the costs of 
the employer’s business”); Richard v. Hall, 874 So.2d 131, 137–38 (La. 2004) (noting that “[i]n 
determining whether a particular accident may be associated with the employer’s business 
enterprise, the court must essentially decide whether the particular accident is a part of the 
more or less inevitable toll of a lawful enterprise,” and that “the scope of employment test 
examines the employment-related risk of injury,” such that “[t]he inquiry requires the trier 
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States, in which the Second Circuit, applying admiralty law, affirmed the 
imposition of vicarious liability on the Coast Guard for vandalism by a 
drunken seaman.51  In this famous decision, Judge Henry Friendly 
rehearsed various justifications for vicarious liability, including the 
narrowest “serves the master’s purpose” and cheapest cost-avoider 
rationales (which he disparaged, though as a purely theoretical matter, not 
on the basis of any empirical evidence), before landing (implicitly) on an 
enterprise causation rationale—inquiring whether the risk is 
“characteristic of [the] activities” of the enterprise, where “the activities of 
the ‘enterprise’ do not reach into areas where the servant does not create 
risks different from those attendant on the activities of the community in 
general.”52   
A quarter-century later, drawing upon Ira Bushey, Judge Guido 
Calabresi (applying the law of Guam, which looks to California law for 
guidance) explicitly endorsed the enterprise causation rationale in Taber v. 
Maine.53  The court held that the United States was vicariously liable for 
                                                
of fact to determine whether the employee’s tortious conduct was so closely connected in 
time, place and causation to his employment-duties as to be regarded a risk of harm fairly 
attributable to the employer’s business, as compared to conduct motivated by purely 
personal considerations entirely extraneous to the employer’s interests”); Carroll Air Sys., 
Inc. v. Greenbaum, 629 So.2d 914, 916–17 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (“The underlying 
philosophy which holds an employer liable for an employee’s negligent acts is the deeply 
rooted sentiment that a business enterprise should not be able to disclaim responsibility for 
accidents which may fairly be said to be the result of its activity.” (emphasis added)); 
Rodriguez-Rivera v. United States, Case No. 8:12-cv-856-T-30TBM, 2014 WL 12625781, at *4–
5 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 24, 2014) (holding U.S. government vicariously liable for damage caused 
by a Marine’s drunk-driving car accident, given that, but for his employment, the accident 
would not have occurred). 
51 See Ira Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 172–73 (2d Cir. 1968) 
(endorsing the enterprise causation rationale for vicarious liability imposed on employers). 
52 Id. at 171–72.  See also Gregory C. Keating, The Idea of Fairness in the Law of Enterprise 
Liability, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1266, 1281 n.45 (1997) (discussing Sykes’s definition of enterprise 
causation as “very similar to Friendly’s characteristic risk criterion”). 
53 Taber v. Maine, 67 F.3d 1029, 1031 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Ira Bushey).  “California has 
adopted the rationale that the employer’s liability should extend beyond his actual or 
possible control over the employees to include risks inherent in or created by the enterprise 
because he, rather than the innocent injured party, is best able to spread the risk through 
prices, rates or liability insurance.”  Rodgers v. Kemper Constr. Co., 50 Cal. App. 3d 608, 618 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (citing Ira Bushey).  See also Mary M. v. Los Angeles, 814 P.2d 1341, 1343–
44 (Cal. 1991) (citing Ira Bushey and noting that vicarious liability can be justified by the need 
to ensure that the victim’s losses are distributed amongst those who benefit from the 
enterprise that gave rise to the harm); Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc. v. Super. Ct. L.A. Cty., 
220 Cal. App. 3d 864, 878 n.10 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (reasoning that “[i]n the context of the 
good faith motion, [one] must be deemed exposed to the possibility of full vicarious liability 
to the plaintiff” when there is an act or omission occurring within the scope of employment); 
Harris v. Trojan Fireworks Co., 120 Cal. App. 3d 157, 163 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (stating that 
“liability is frequently determined by who is best able to spread the risk of loss through the 
prices charged”). 
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injuries caused by a Navy serviceman’s drunk-driving accident.54  
According to Judge Calabresi, the vicarious liability doctrine is 
“concerned with the allocation of the cost of industrial injury,” and thus 
its applicability should turn on the “relationship between the 
servicemember’s behavior and the costs of the military enterprise.”55  
Moreover, Judge Calabresi reasoned, “[G]iven the pervasive control that 
the military exercises over its personnel while they are on a base, it is 
totally in keeping with the doctrine of respondeat superior to allocate the 
costs of base operations to the government.”56  
B. Direct Negligence Liability for Intentional Torts “Outside the Scope of 
Employment” 
We move now from employer liability for employees’ commission of 
intentional torts “within the scope of employment” to those committed 
“outside the scope of employment.”  Restatement § 317 (“Duty of Master 
to Control Conduct of Servant”) provides the contours under which “[a] 
master is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control his servant 
while acting outside the scope of his employment as to prevent him from 
intentionally harming others or from so conducting himself as to create an 
unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them.”57  Section 317 liability attaches 
when the servant “(i) is upon the premises in possession of the master or 
upon which the servant is privileged to enter only as his servant, or (ii) is 
using a chattel of the master.”58  Not all jurisdictions have expressly 
adopted § 317, but all jurisdictions seem to recognize some form of direct 
liability against the employer for negligent hiring, supervision, or 
retention.59 
1. Narrow Recognition by Courts 
Courts have recognized direct employer liability for employees’ 
intentional torts committed outside the scope of employment in very 
limited situations.60  As succinctly summarized: 
                                                
54 See Taber, 67 F.3d at 1050. 
55 Id. at 1036–37 (emphasis omitted). 
56 Id. at 1037 (citing William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Positive Economic Theory 
of Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851, 914–15 (1981). 
57 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
58 Id. § 317(a)(i)–(ii). 
59 See, e.g., 53 N.Y. JURIS. EMP. REL. § 391 (explaining when direct liability is imposed on 
employers for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention). 
60 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
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[C]ases that rely on [Restatement (Second) of Torts] section 
317 generally involve rather obvious acts of negligence on 
the part of the employer—for example, the knowing 
retention of an incompetent employee or the knowing 
allowance of dangerous practices by an employee even 
though relatively inexpensive measures could have 
stopped the practices.61 
The two prongs of direct employer liability, whether pursuant to 
causes of action based on § 317 or negligent hiring, supervision, or 
retention—knowledge and identification of preventative measures—are 
demanding threshold requirements and thus constitute formidable 
barriers to employer direct liability. 
a. Knowledge Requirement 
The knowledge requirement, as construed by the courts, presents a 
seemingly insuperable barrier to employer direct liability in the context of 
employee intentional torts.  In case after case, courts have dismissed such 
direct liability claims against employers in a variety of settings, including 
ones in which employers provide services to vulnerable populations (and 
thus might be thought to have fiduciary duties above and beyond any 
duty to take reasonable care)—such as rehabilitation centers, schools, and 
churches—on the grounds that the employer lacked knowledge of the risk 
posed by the employee.62  Moreover, courts have insisted upon an 
exacting type of particular knowledge of the specific risks involved.63  
Even where the employer was on notice regarding an employee’s prior 
acts of misconduct (such that the employer might have been expected to 
                                                
61 Sykes, Boundaries, supra note 7, at 591 (emphasis added). 
62 See, e.g., Total Rehab. & Med. Ctrs., Inc. v. E.B.O., 915 So. 2d 694, 695, 696–97 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2005) (holding that a patient in a rehabilitation center who was allegedly raped in a 
company-owned van during the course of an employee’s assigned responsibility to transport 
the patient between facilities did not establish a negligent supervision claim against the 
center because the employer was not on notice that the employee was prone to commit the 
tortious or criminal act); Stephenson v. Sch. Bd. Polk Cty., 467 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1985) (holding that a school board was not liable for negligent supervision because “there 
was no indication from the record that [it] was put on notice of the harmful propensities of 
[its] employees”); Willis v. Dade Cty. Sch. Bd., 411 So. 2d 245, 246 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1982) (“[T]o state a cause of action for the tort of negligent hiring or retention recognized in 
Florida, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that the employer was put on notice of the 
harmful propensities of the employee.” (citations omitted)); Iglesia Cristiana Casa Senor, Inc. 
v. L.M., 783 So. 2d 353, 358 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that a church was not liable for 
sexual assault of a minor by a pastor because “it [did not have] constructive or actual notice 
that [he] was unfit to work as a pastor at the [c]hurch”). 
63 See Total Rehab. & Med. Ctrs., 915 So. 2d at 696 (giving an example where specific risks 
and particular knowledge were analyzed in the context of employer liability). 
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take extra precautionary measures), courts have rejected negligent hiring, 
supervision, and retention claims where such prior bad acts were different 
in kind from the type of intentional tort committed in the case at hand.64 
b. Specification of Preventative Measures 
Moreover, even if the knowledge barrier is overcome, negligence-
based employer direct liability forces the plaintiff to specify the 
preventative measures that should have been taken.  Placing this burden 
on the plaintiff serves in practice to restrict the domain of measures 
considered by the court.  Consider, for example, Roman Catholic Bishop v. 
Superior Court of San Diego County, a California case in which a fourteen-
year-old girl and her family sued a church because of a priest’s alleged 
molestation of the girl.65  Given that the priest had no criminal history of 
child molestation, a background check alone would not have uncovered 
his propensity to commit such an act.66  The plaintiffs identified specific 
preventative measures that the church nonetheless failed to take, 
including:  (a) an investigation of the priest’s background to determine if 
the priest previously had sexual relationships with adults; and 
(b) requiring the priest “to undergo a psychological evaluation before 
hiring him.”67  The court refused to impose a duty upon the church either 
to undertake such an investigation or to require a psychological 
evaluation because both measures would have unacceptably interfered 
with the priest’s privacy.68  And, having considered the specific untaken 
precautions alleged by the plaintiffs, the court ended its analysis.69 
Many jurisdictions combine stringency on the knowledge 
requirement with exacting specification of preventative measures.  For 
                                                
64 Dibrill v. Normandy Assocs., Inc., 383 S.W.3d 77 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012), is illustrative.  In 
that case, an employer defendant was granted summary judgment in a negligent hiring claim 
“because employe[e]’s prior acts of misconduct—which involved slapping his wife and a 
physical altercation with a co-worker—did not ‘put him at risk to commit the sexual offense 
on plaintiff’ such that the employer could be held liable for negligent hiring.”  Id. at 88.  The 
court also affirmed summary judgment in favor of the employer on plaintiff’s negligent 
retention and supervision claims “because the combination of the employee’s pre-
employment assaults and a sexually harassing comment he made during his employment 
did not ‘put employer on notice that [the employee] had dangerous sexual propensities that 
it would be foreseeable that [the employee] would sexually assault a building visitor.”  Id.  
For further consideration of the costs of relaxing this “knowledge of the precise risk” prong, 
see infra note 106. 
65 See Roman Catholic Bishop v. Super. Ct. San Diego Cty., 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399, 400–01 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1996).  
66 See id. at 404–05. 
67 Id. at 405–06. 
68 See id. 
69 See id. (concluding summary judgment in favor of priest was proper on negligent hiring 
and supervision). 
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example, to make out a prima facie case for negligent hiring in Florida, a 
plaintiff must demonstrate: 
(1) the employer was required to make an appropriate 
investigation of the employee and failed to do so; (2) an 
appropriate investigation would have revealed the 
unsuitability of the employee for the particular duty to be 
performed or for employment in general; and (3) it was 
unreasonable for the employer to hire the employee in 
light of the information he knew or should have known.70 
In Malicki v. Doe, another church abuse case, the Florida Supreme 
Court evaluated whether the defendants could be held liable for negligent 
hiring in light of their failure “to make inquiries into [the priest’s] 
background, qualifications, reputation, work history, and/or criminal 
history prior to employing him in the capacity of Associate Pastor.”71  The 
upshot is that, typically, only in the most blatantly obvious cases of an 
untaken precaution—for example, where employers completely fail to 
inquire into the employee’s background—do courts recognize employer 
negligence in the context of employee intentional torts.72 
2. Rationale for Limitations on Direct Employer Liability 
Courts have reasoned that Restatement § 317 must impose a narrow 
duty on employers—or else a tight causal link between the employer’s acts 
or omissions and the employee’s tort or crime—in order to prevent 
employers from becoming guarantors of their employees.73  As one court 
elaborated: 
The limitations expressed in § 317(a)(i) are intended to 
restrict the master’s liability for a servant’s intentional 
acts outside the course and scope of employment to 
situations where either the master has some degree of 
control of the premises where the act occurred or where 
the master, because of the employment relationship, has 
                                                
70 Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 362 (Fla. 2002). 
71 Id.  The court also examined whether “the Church Defendants negligently placed 
[plaintiffs] under the supervision of Malicki [the priest], when the Church Defendants either 
knew or should have known that Malicki had the propensity to commit sexual assaults and 
molestations.”  Id. 
72 See, e.g., Blair v. Def. Servs., Inc., 386 F.3d 623, 629 (4th Cir. 2004) (concluding a jury 
could find employer negligent for failing to run a background check on the employee). 
73 See Watson v. Hialeah, 552 So. 2d 1146, 1150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (reaffirming the 
causal link between employer’s action and the crime). 
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placed the servant in a position to obtain access to some 
premises that are not controlled by the master.74 
Similar to the enterprise causation rationale, “Such limitations serve to 
restrict the master’s liability for a servant’s purely personal conduct which 
has no relationship to the servant’s employment and the master’s ability 
to control the servant’s conduct or prevent harm.”75   
In this way, direct liability claims often intersect with acts considered 
within the scope of employment due to the requirement that liability 
attaches to acts occurring at the employer’s business location or 
committed during the conduct of the employer’s business.  As the Tenth 
Circuit noted, in cases of employer direct liability: 
[T]he existence of a duty to the injured party was based 
on actions against a customer or co-worker which took 
place on the working premises during the time 
employment services were normally rendered.  In none 
of such cases was the employee not acting in the course of 
employment, nor was the injurious action removed from 
the employer’s premises or without any nexus to the 
employer’s operations.76 
But, once again, courts have read these limitations very broadly.  For 
example, in Napieralski v. Unity Church of Greater Portland, Napieralski was 
allegedly sexually assaulted by a minister while meeting with him at the 
minister’s church-provided home.77  The meeting was neither for church 
business nor spiritual counseling.78  Napieralski argued that the church 
was negligent in supervising its employee, but the Maine Supreme 
Judicial Court rejected this argument, partly because “[w]here an 
employer does provide a residence for employees, it is very different from 
the employer’s premises as addressed in the Restatement.  The employee 
retains rights of privacy and quiet enjoyment in the residence that are not 
subject to close supervision or domination by the employer.”79 
                                                
74 Weaver v. African Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., 54 S.W.3d 575, 582 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2001). 
75 Id. at 582–83. 
76 Girard v. Trade Prof’ls, Inc., 13 F. App’x 865, 869–70 (10th Cir. 2001) (emphasis omitted). 
77 See Napieralski v. Unity Church of Greater Portland, 802 A.2d 391, 392 (Me. 2002). 
78 Id. at 393. 
79 Id. 
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C. Revisiting “Scope of Employment” as a Dividing Line 
The doctrinal concept of “scope of employment” acts as a proxy for 
causal nexus or employer control—some notion of which must exist across 
both employer vicarious liability and direct negligence liability realms.  In 
this Part, I challenge the theoretical and empirical soundness of the courts’ 
use of “scope of employment” as a dividing line between the availability 
of vicarious liability and direct negligence claims against employers for 
employee intentional torts. 
First, we consider the extent to which the doctrine of vicarious 
liability, with its insistence upon an employee acting within the “scope of 
employment” as a prerequisite for employer vicarious liability, comports 
with an economic efficiency justification.  Recall that Sykes argued that the 
“scope of employment” limitation on employer vicarious liability was 
efficient so long as it aligned with his notion of “enterprise causation.”80  
As we have seen above, however, Sykes’s conception of “enterprise 
causation” is very broad as compared with the courts’ (Friendly, J. and 
Calabresi, J., notwithstanding) extremely narrow recognition of what falls 
within the “scope of employment,” particularly with respect to employee 
intentional torts.81 
Second, with respect to the choice between employer vicarious 
liability and employer direct negligence, Sykes claimed that “[w]hen the 
‘causal’ relationship between the activities of the entity subject to vicarious 
liability and the prospective wrong is weak . . . vicarious liability based on 
negligence [i.e., direct negligence liability] is superior to strict vicarious 
liability.”82  Thus, considering § 317 direct liability, Sykes concluded that 
“if the scope of employment is circumscribed to encompass only those 
torts substantially ‘caused’ by the business enterprise, section 317’s 
approach to torts committed outside the scope of employment is clearly 
efficient.”83  In other words, if scope of employment serves as a proxy for 
enterprise causation, where this causal link is weak, it makes sense to 
impose the heightened requirements of negligence-based liability (namely 
knowledge and identification of preventative measures).84  In this way, the 
                                                
80 See Sykes, Boundaries, supra note 7, at 571. 
81 See id. at 587.  Sykes likewise discovered a divergence between doctrine and theory 
when he examined (to a limited extent) the scope of employment rule in the context of the 
“frolic and detour” motor vehicle tort cases at the rule’s boundary.  Id. (describing how courts 
decided whether the employee acted outside the scope of employment in a “frolic or detour” 
by examining either the length of the detour or else the foreseeability of the detour).  See also 
Sykes, Economics, supra note 7, at 1265 (noting, in the context of service station torts, that 
courts used “indicia of control [that] appear[ed] to have little or no economic significance”). 
82 Sykes, Boundaries, supra note 7, at 579. 
83 Id. at 590–91. 
84 Id. at 577, 590–91. 
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heightened duty requirements in some sense compensate for the weaker 
causal link. 
But, apart from the strength of causal link, are additional factors 
relevant when choosing between vicarious liability and direct negligence 
approaches?  Here, we return to the basic (though sometimes overlooked) 
point that vicarious liability is a form of strict liability and thus the 
foundational differences between strict liability and negligence pertain.  
Sykes alluded to one of these—namely administrative costs: 
One must always be alert to the possibility that one 
liability rule may be cheaper to administer than another 
or may tend to produce fewer meritless suits.  With 
respect to the choice between strict vicarious liability and 
vicarious liability based on negligence, the negligence 
approach probably leads to incrementally higher 
administrative costs associated with the need to litigate 
the employer’s negligence, whereas the strict liability 
approach probably leads to incrementally higher 
administrative costs associated with a higher number of 
lawsuits.85 
Curiously missing, however, is any consideration of another 
potentially significant factor—risk of under-detection of employer 
preventative devices.  We thus turn to consider the theoretical and 
practical relevance of this fundamental factor, which then sets the stage 
for our re-examination of the rationales for employer liability for 
employee intentional torts. 
IV.  VICARIOUS LIABILITY AS A QUASI-SUBSTITUTE FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
In this Part, I highlight under-detection of employer preventative 
measures as a significant factor in the choice between strict-vicarious 
liability and direct negligence theories.86  More ambitiously, I then connect 
deterrence theory and the under-detection rationale to the doctrines 
governing employer liability (vicarious and direct, including punitive 
damages) for employee intentional torts.87  Several novel implications 
follow. 
First, strict-vicarious liability may be more efficient than direct 
negligence liability where there is a significant risk of under-detection of 
potential employer preventative measures.  Thus, where such significant 
                                                
85 Id. at 579. 
86 See infra Part IV.A. 
87 See infra Part IV.B. 
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risk of under-detection exists, the scope for strict-vicarious liability—
regardless of “scope of employment”—should be expanded in the context 
of negligent hiring, supervising, and retention scenarios.88 
Second, courts should recognize calls for punitive damages 
predicated on claims for negligent hiring, supervising, or training (e.g., 
§ 317 direct negligence claims).  Such punitive damages should be 
awarded where compensatory damages will under-deter, including 
where the employer’s failures to exercise reasonable care will likely be 
under-detected.  Indeed, the risk of under-detection seems particularly 
salient in this context of employee intentional torts, where vicarious 
liability claims (at least “within the scope of employment”) are justified at 
least in part on this rationale.  
Third, where strict-vicarious liability is justified on the basis of under-
detection, then vicarious liability for punitive damages may over-deter.  
Punitive damages—at least imposed to force internalization of the total 
costs of harms due to under-detection—would not seem warranted.  This 
could provide a rationale for courts’ refusal to recognize negligence-based 
claims where an employer has conceded that its employee committed an 
intentional tort within the scope of employment.  However, a better 
strategy would be for courts to deploy a burden-shifting approach to force 
the employer to come forward with information regarding the 
precautionary preventative measures in place in order to foreclose 
punitive damages.89   
With these three propositions in mind, we can re-examine the 
complicity rule for employer liability for punitive damages (Restatement 
§ 909, Punitive Damages Against a Principal).90  It appears to mitigate the 
risk of over-deterrence by requiring some degree of employer fault—
namely employee actions are “authorized” per § 909(a) or “ratified or 
approved” per § 909(d).91  It limits “scope of employment” liability to 
agents acting in a “managerial capacity” per § 909(c).92  Finally, punitive 
damages per § 909(b) (“reckless[ly]” employing an “unfit” agent) is akin 
to punitive damages under § 908 (“Punitive Damages”) with direct 
negligence liability as a predicate.93  Seen in this light, § 909 can be 
defended on efficiency grounds. 
                                                
88 See infra Section IV.B.1. 
89 See infra Section IV.B.3 (elaborating on this novel proposed burden-shifting approach). 
90 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (listing the 
requirements for punitive damages in a vicarious liability case).  
91 Id. § 909(a), (d).  
92 Id. § 909(c). 
93 Id. § 909(b).  See also id. § 908 (explaining that the purposes of punitive damages are to 
punish and to deter); infra Section IV.B.2.b (discussing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908, 
Punitive Damages).  
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A. Under-Detection of Employer Preventative Measures 
Under-detection of employers’ failures to take measures to prevent 
their employees’ intentional torts may be prevalent, especially within 
large employers and institutions with a complex internal organization.94  
As a theoretical matter, where such under-detection is a concern, strict 
liability will have an edge over negligence liability in terms of inducing 
the employer to more carefully screen, monitor, and train its employees.95  
Alternatively, punitive damages may be warranted to induce the 
employer to take requisite care.96 
1. Vicarious Liability 
Gary Schwartz (in an under-appreciated article) was perhaps the first 
to highlight the practical and theoretical argument for strict-vicarious 
liability.97  Schwartz concluded that “[t]he intriguing benefit of strict 
liability . . . is that it can do a better job than a negligence regime in 
achieving that regime’s own goal of encouraging the employer’s cost-
justified risk-reducing measures.”98 
Schwartz makes two primary claims.  First, Schwartz picks up on the 
administrative costs issue, noting that “strict liability spares the legal 
system the costs of investigating and then litigating the negligence 
issue.”99  As Martha Chamallas further elaborates, “[S]ome victims will be 
able to establish that employers were independently negligent for failing 
to screen, train, or monitor the offending employee.  Such a direct 
                                                
94 See infra Section IV.A.1 (discussing strict-vicarious liability’s edge over direct employer 
negligence in such situations). 
95 There is vast economic literature on the choice between strict liability and negligence 
regimes on the basis of myriad factors, injecting more complications into the equation, such 
as legal uncertainty.  Compare, e.g., John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of 
Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 986 (1984) (“[U]ncertainty 
can produce incentives to over- or undercomply even when damages are calculated 
exactly.”), with, e.g., Marcel Kahan, Causation and Incentives to Take Care Under the Negligence 
Rule, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 427, 427–47 (1989) (arguing that once the issue of causation is factored 
into negligence liability, it is more likely that individuals will take too little care rather than 
too much care). 
 My aim here is not to make a theoretical contribution to this literature.  Rather, my goal 
is simply to draw attention to a well-established factor—under-detection—that remains 
relatively unexplored in the debate surrounding employer liability for employee intentional 
torts. 
96 See infra Section IV.A.2. 
97 See Gary T. Schwartz, The Hidden and Fundamental Issue of Employer Vicarious Liability, 69 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1739, 1740–41 (1996) (pointing out that “the strict liability doctrine of vicarious 
liability” is often ignored in negligence cases). 
98 Id. at 1760. 
99 Id. 
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negligence claim, however, is far more difficult and costly to prove . . . .”100  
In sum, direct negligence liability is more uncertain and difficult to prove 
than strict liability.  
Second, Schwartz highlights that an employer’s failure to adopt cost-
justified precautions might not be detected.101  If employers anticipate this, 
they will lack adequate incentives to take care.102  Moreover, it seems likely 
that when the defendant is a large institution, such failures will be 
especially difficult for the court to identify.103  Jennifer Arlen and Reinier 
Kraakman have elaborated on this under-detection rationale in the context 
of the choice between negligence and strict liability regimes in controlling 
corporate misconduct.104 
At the same time, there are public policy concerns about strict liability 
going too far.105  Indeed, the threshold knowledge requirement of § 317 
direct negligence liability—especially if it is deployed in situations with a 
weak causal link—promotes efficiency to the extent that it avoids inducing 
                                                
100 Martha Chamallas, Vicarious Liability in Torts:  The Sex Exception, 48 VAL. U. L. REV. 133, 
136 (2013); id. at 153 (“Vicarious liability under this account saves the cost of investigating 
the existence of the untaken precaution and then litigating the negligence issue.”). 
101 See Schwartz, supra note 97, at 1760–64. 
102 Id. at 1756.  
103 See id. at 1764. 
104 See Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct:  An Analysis of 
Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687 (1997).  Arlen and Kraakman share my main 
focus on institutional liability (namely “how should the law structure the liability of the 
firm?”), and highlight under-detection as a significant factor in the optimal regime choice for 
inducing preventive measures.  Id. at 689, 705.  They advocate a mixed regime that includes 
elements of both strict liability and negligence in the context of corporate misconduct.  Their 
main goal is to create proper incentives for companies to monitor, investigate, and report 
employee wrongdoing.  See id. at 694 (“Strict liability clearly dominates where corporate 
liability is deployed to encourage the private sanctioning of corporate agents, and is weakly 
preferable where it is a means of inducing firms to adopt preventive measures.  However, 
duty-based liability is generally better able to induce firms to undertake optimal policing 
measures such as monitoring, investigating, and reporting.”). 
105 See Kirlin v. Halverson, 758 N.W.2d 436 (S.D. 2008).  In Kirlin, the court did not hold an 
employer liable for failing to fire an employee with a criminal record because:  
Such a risk of liability might make employers hesitant to hire those 
people, severely limiting employment opportunities.  Halverson’s 
history of violence only includes a single conviction which resulted from 
a domestic, not workplace, confrontation and an assault charge that was 
dismissed. Requiring employers to fire employees or face liability under 
these circumstances is untenable, especially considering Halverson’s 
minimal contact with others.  “Such a rule would deter employers from 
hiring workers with a criminal record and ‘offend our civilized concept 
that society must make a reasonable effort to rehabilitate those who 
have erred so they can be assimilated into the community.’”   
Id. at 453–54 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). 
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employers to take excess precautionary measures to prevent hypothetical 
wrongs. 
2. Punitive Damages 
Law and economics theories of punitive damages have focused 
primarily on under-enforcement, a key component of which is the 
influence of the probability of detecting the wrongful conduct.106  While 
critics reject the viability of this non-retributive rationale for punitive 
damages, it has emerged unscathed from the U.S. Supreme Court’s attack 
on punitive damages and holds considerable sway with a number of 
courts.107 
One economic rationale for punitive damages is a cost-internalization 
theory focusing on the likelihood of under-detection of a defendant’s 
wrongdoing.  Robert Cooter pioneered this theory.108  And A. Mitchell 
Polinsky and Steven Shavell elaborated in a seminal article, Punitive 
Damages:  An Economic Analysis, in which they argued that “the proper 
magnitude of damages is the harm the defendant has caused, multiplied 
by a factor reflecting the probability of his escaping liability.”109  As they 
further explained, the use of a multiplier and excess damages over 
compensatory damages “will make defendants pay on average for harm 
actually done and thus will lead to socially desirable behavior in terms of 
precautions and participation in risky activities.”110  
Others have elaborated on the role of punitive damages to respond to 
under-detection and under-enforcement more generally.  In Punitive 
Damages as Societal Damages, I extended the rationale beyond under-
detection to include a broader array of factors that might lead 
                                                
106 For discussion of the various economic theories of punitive damages, see Catherine M. 
Sharkey, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages:  Theory, Empirics, and Doctrine, in RES. 
HANDBOOK ECON. TORTS 486, 488 (Jennifer Arlen ed., Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013) 
[hereinafter Sharkey, Economic Analysis] (“The predominant law and economics theory of 
punitive damages is based upon optimal deterrence or loss internalization and focuses on 
the under-enforcement problem:  supracompensatory damages are needed when under-
detection of harms or other factors leads to inefficiently low expected liability, which is 
insufficient to induce optimal care.  Other contenders include gain elimination or 
disgorgement and inducement of voluntary transfers, also known as the property rights 
perspective.”). 
107 See id. 
108 Robert D. Cooter, Punitive Damages for Deterrence:  When and How Much?, 40 ALA. L. REV. 
1143, 1148  (1989) (“In general, the punitive multiplier should equal the reciprocal of the 
enforcement error for the sake of deterrence, which I call the ‘rule of the reciprocal.’”). 
109 A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages:  An Economic Analysis, 111 
HARV. L. REV. 869, 887 (1998) (emphasis omitted). 
110 Id. at 887–88.   
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compensatory damages to underestimate the total social harms inflicted 
by the defendant’s actions.111   
There is a continuing debate regarding whether the economic theory 
for punitive damages has had any durable influence on the courts.  As 
judges, Richard Posner and Guido Calabresi led the way toward 
recognition of the economic deterrence rationale by emphasizing the 
significance of the defendant’s likelihood of escaping liability.  Thus, in 
Kemezy v. Peters, Judge Posner reasoned almost straight out of the law and 
economics theorist’s playbook: 
When a tortious act is concealable, a judgment equal to 
the harm done by the act will underdeter.  Suppose a 
person who goes around assaulting other people is 
caught only half the time.  Then in comparing the costs, 
in the form of anticipated damages, of the assaults with 
the benefits to him, he will discount the costs (but not the 
benefits, because they are realized in every assault) by 50 
percent, and so in deciding whether to commit the next 
assault he will not be confronted by the full social cost of 
his activity.112 
And in Ciraolo v. New York, a case involving city-wide illegal police strip-
searching policies, Judge Calabresi proclaimed that “[s]uch a [multiplier] 
                                                
111 Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 369 (2003) 
(“[T]he punitive multiplier, which focuses on underenforcement error due to nondetection 
of harms, is in some sense a subset of the broader economic deterrence goal of internalization 
of total costs.”).  See also Sharkey, Economic Analysis, supra note 106, at 489 (“Under-
enforcement results from a variety of factors including under-detection of wrongful conduct, 
failure to sue, plaintiffs’ inability to prove negligence and causation, and error.”); Joni Hersch 
& W. Kip Viscusi, Saving Lives Through Punitive Damages, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 229, 242 (2010) 
(arguing that probability of detection should be combined with value of statistical life to 
determine the appropriate level of punitive damages to optimally deter harmful behavior). 
112 Kemezy v. Peters, 79 F.3d 33, 35 (7th Cir. 1996).  See also Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, 
Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.) (“The award of punitive damages in this 
case . . . serves the . . . purpose of limiting the defendant’s ability to profit from its fraud by 
escaping detection and (private) prosecution.  If a tortfeasor is ‘caught’ only half the time he 
commits torts, then when he is caught he should be punished twice as heavily in order to 
make up for the times he gets away.”).  The economic rationale for punitive damages seems 
especially live and well in the Seventh Circuit.  See Zazú Designs v. L’Oréal, S.A., 979 F.2d 
499, 508 (7th Cir. 1992) (“Punitive damages are appropriate when some wrongful conduct 
evades detection; a multiplier then both compensates and deters.”); FDIC v. W.R. Grace & 
Co., 877 F.2d 614, 623 (7th Cir. 1989) (“The most straightforward rationale for punitive 
damages . . . is that they are necessary to deter torts or crimes that are concealable.  Suppose 
the average defrauder is brought to book only half the time.  To confront him with a sanction 
that will make fraud worthless to him and thus deter him, it is necessary that when he is 
caught he be made to pay twice as much as his profits.”). 
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conception of punitive damages, again, is not new, and it has been 
recognized by courts as well as scholars.”113 
Critics have nonetheless argued that the U.S. Supreme Court has flat-
out rejected the under-deterrence rationale for punitive damages.  In State 
Farm v. Campbell, the Court maintained that “the argument that State Farm 
will be punished in only the rare case . . . had little to do with the actual 
harm sustained by the Campbells.”114  Indeed, according to the Court, 
such an argument would be “a departure from well-established 
constraints on punitive damages.”115  The Court, however, provided scant 
reasoning here.  Indeed, in almost the same breath in which it criticized 
the punitive multiplier approach, the Court echoed its statement from 
BMW v. Gore that a higher ratio of punitive to compensatory damages 
might be necessary where “the injury is hard to detect.”116  
Moreover, in prior work, I have argued: 
By reconceptualizing these underdeterrence damages as 
societal compensation, as opposed to quasi-fines or 
penalties, the societal damages approach would seem to 
survive the retributive-punishment-focused due process 
constraints of State Farm . . . .  Moreover, the approach 
would favor a new kind of distributive scheme that 
would attempt either to compensate society directly for 
the imposition of those harms or else to direct 
compensation to some proxy that would attempt to 
compensate categories of individuals likely harmed by a 
defendant’s similar wrongdoing.117 
                                                
113 Ciraolo v. New York, 216 F.3d 236, 237, 245 (2d Cir. 2000). 
114 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 427 (2003). 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 425.  In BMW v. Gore, Justice Stevens (for the majority) and Justice Breyer (in 
concurrence) embraced under-detection as a rationale for punitive damages.  517 U.S. 559, 
582 (1996) (Stevens, J.) (“A higher ratio [of punitive damages to compensatory damages] may 
also be justified in cases in which the injury is hard to detect . . . .”).  Justice Breyer’s 
concurrence in Gore mentions economic theories of punitive damages that focus on ensuring 
that a wrongdoer pays for “the total cost of the harm caused.”  Id. at 592–93 (Breyer, J., 
concurring).  He interprets these theories as permitting juries “to calculate punitive damages 
by making a rough estimate of global harm, [and] dividing that estimate by a similarly rough 
estimate of the number of successful lawsuits that would likely be brought.”  Id. at 593. 
117 Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, supra note 111, at 401–02.  See also 
Sharkey, Economic Analysis, supra note 106, at 496 (“Despite its criticism of the optimal 
deterrence rationale and its silence with respect to the alternative gain-elimination or market-
circumvention rationales, it would be wrong to conclude that the U.S. Supreme Court has 
closed the door entirely on economic rationales of punitive damages.”). 
Sharkey: Institutional Liability for Employees’ Intentional Torts: Vicario
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press,
30 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53 
Thus, to my mind, the economic deterrence rationale for punitive 
damages persists—not only as a theoretical matter but also as a practical 
reality in the courts.118 
As a doctrinal matter, punitive damages can be imposed for 
punishment or deterrence—by which I mean non-retributive, economic 
deterrence.  Punitive damages under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908, 
Punitive Damages (“Restatement § 908”), though typically characterized as 
serving as retributive punishment, can also serve a deterrent function 
justified by under-detection (as a means of internalization of total societal 
costs).119  The same holds true in the context of employer liability for 
punitive damages based on employee intentional torts.  Indeed, “[w]hile 
the policy most often mentioned for requiring [employer] ratification or 
authorization is punishment of the wrongdoer, the supposed deterrent 
effect of punitive damages is frequently cited by courts not requiring 
intentional acts.”120 
B. Re-assessing Employer Liability for Employee Intentional Torts 
In this Part, I explore how bringing the under-detection rationale to 
the fore shapes the theoretical choice between employer strict-vicarious 
liability and direct negligence liability for employee intentional torts.121  I 
then widen the focus to include the role of punitive damages.  The stakes 
                                                
118 Moreover, as I have argued (quite exhaustively, in the face of numerous critics’ 
protestations to the contrary), this conception of punitive damages as societal damages can 
likewise withstand the Court’s further attack on punitive damages in Philip Morris USA v. 
Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007).  See Catherine M. Sharkey, Federal Incursions and State Defiance:  
Punitive Damages in the Wake of Philip Morris v. Williams, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 449, 468–
69 (2010).  See also Sharkey, Economic Analysis, supra note 106, at 495 (“The U.S. Supreme 
Court, amidst its forays—or incursions—into the state law realm of punitive damages, has 
always insisted that its analysis begins with the legitimate state interests served by punitive 
damages.  To date, the Court has given a quick nod to state-defined goals of punishment and 
deterrence, before diving headlong into an analysis that, by and large, has emphasized 
retributive punishment goals.  But the states have, in essence, enabled the Court to go down 
this path.  They have, as yet, not exploited their power to redirect the Court—and thus the 
evolution of punitive damages doctrine.” (emphasis omitted)). 
119 Restatement § 908 provides: 
(1) Punitive damages are damages, other than compensatory or nominal 
damages, awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous 
conduct and to deter him and others like him from similar conduct in 
the future. 
(2) Punitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous, 
because of the defendant’s evil motive or his reckless indifference to the 
rights of others. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 908(1)–(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
120 William T. Curtis, Liability of Employers for Punitive Damages Resulting from Acts of 
Employees, 54 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 829, 842 (1978). 
121 See infra Sections IV.B.1, IV.B.2. 
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of a case (including likelihood of inducing settlement) increase 
dramatically when employers can be held liable for punitive damages if 
initially found liable for employee intentional torts.  I explore the various 
rules governing the viability of punitive damages in the vicarious liability 
setting as well as with respect to direct negligence claims.122  Each of these 
variants has been defended on deterrence grounds.  To date, little work 
has been done on assessing the salient differences between the 
approaches. 
1. The Case for Expanding Strict-Vicarious Liability 
As discussed above, strict liability may be more efficient than direct 
negligence liability where there is a significant risk of under-detection.  
Thus, the case for employer vicarious liability is stronger where there is a 
significant risk of under-detection of potential employer preventative 
measures.  It is difficult to evaluate the prevalence of the under-detection 
rationale in light of the lack of empirical data—or really prospects for 
measuring—the relevant fraction of cases (or incidents) in which the 
concern is rife. 
That said, as we have seen, in employer direct liability cases, the 
threshold knowledge and specification of preventative measures 
requirements train the court’s focus on the prospect of cost-justified 
precautions that the employer failed to take.123  And, in the words of the 
Canadian Supreme Court:  
Beyond the narrow band of employer conduct that 
attracts direct liability in negligence lies a vast area where 
imaginative and efficient administration and supervision 
can reduce the risk that the employer has introduced into 
the community.  Holding the employer vicariously liable 
for the wrongs of its employee may encourage the 
employer to take such steps . . . .124 
                                                
122 See infra Sections IV.B.2.b, IV.B.3. 
123 See generally Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 2002) (discussing several cases in which 
the courts analyze preventative measure requirements).  
124 Chamallas, supra note 100, at 152–53 (quoting Bazley v. Curry, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 534, para. 
33 (Can.) (emphasis added)).  According to Chamallas, “The innovative aspect of Bazley is its 
application of ‘enterprise risk’ to the realm of intentional torts and sexual abuse in 
particular.”  See id. at 181.  The Bazley court also noted:  “In many cases evidence will be 
lacking or have long since disappeared.  The proof of appropriate standards is a difficult and 
uneven matter.”  Bazley v. Curry, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 534, para. 32 (Can.).  Here, I highlight 
instead the under-detection rationale. 
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To illustrate, recall the Malicki v. Doe church abuse case discussed 
above.125  It seems fair to say that the court considered only a “narrow 
band of employer conduct” when it decided to impose a fairly limited 
duty upon the church.126  In so doing, it failed to consider myriad other 
“imaginative” precautions that might have been taken or potential 
methods of controlling employee behavior.  For example, assuming there 
is a long-term relationship between the church and its pastor, the church 
could structure its bonus, promotion, and termination schemes to focus 
on creating an environment attuned to preventing abuse as an 
institutional matter.  Or consider another case, Total Rehabilitation & 
Medical Centers, Inc. v. E.B.O., in which the court rejected a negligent 
supervision claim brought by a rehabilitation center patient who was 
allegedly raped in a company-owned van during the course of an 
employee’s assigned responsibility to transport the patient between 
facilities.127  Employers have plenty of supervision and punishment 
methods available to discourage tortious—and even criminal—behavior 
like this.  Perhaps the van could have been rigged with cameras, or 
employer policies could prevent employees from being alone with a 
patient.  
In sum, strict liability could thus promote as-yet-unimagined and 
currently untaken preventative measures.128  In each of these cases, a 
motivated and innovative employer could find ways to investigate 
employees’ past conduct more thoroughly and supervise their present 
conduct more comprehensively.  Moreover, courts might increasingly rely 
                                                
125 See supra text accompanying notes 70–72 (evaluating, in the context of sexual assault on 
a minor, whether a church could be liable for negligent hiring for failing to look into a priest’s 
background). 
126 Compare Bazley v. Curry, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 534, para 33 (Can.) (“Beyond the narrow band 
of employer conduct that attracts direct liability in negligence lies a vast area where 
imaginative and efficient administration and supervision can reduce the risk that the 
employer has introduced into the community.”), with Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 364–65 
(Fla. 2002) (highlighting the requirement that the employer “knew or should have known of 
the tortious conduct”). 
127 See Total Rehab. & Med. Ctrs., Inc. v. E.B.O, 915 So. 2d 694, 695, 696–97 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2005) (rejecting a negligent supervision claim brought by a patient allegedly raped by 
a company employee during the course of his responsibilities).  See also supra note 62 (listing 
cases in which the court rejected claims against organizations providing services to 
vulnerable populations). 
128 See Bruce Feldthusen, Vicarious Liability for Sexual Torts, in TORTS TOMORROW:  A TRIBUTE 
TO JOHN FLEMING 221, 226 (Mullany & Linden eds., 1998) (“It often requires expensive, 
profession-specific research studies to identify cost-effective measures.  Absent vicarious 
liability, there may be no incentive for the employer to contribute to this body of knowledge.  
If employers are better positioned than plaintiffs, judges[,] or juries to identify the efficient 
deterrence measures, then strict liability is the standard that will best encourage them to do 
so.”) (footnote omitted). 
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on outside experts who bring a wealth of experience in terms of 
identifying the prevalence of certain types of under-detected harms in 
various institutions and proposed strategies for preventing and mitigating 
employee misconduct.  For example, regarding sexual abuse in the 
educational context, courts might take notice of the empirical evidence of 
the prevalence of abuse as well as the existence of manuals and guidelines 
for the detection and prevention of such abuse to substantiate claims that 
there is a significant risk of under-detection of employer preventative 
measures.129 
2. The Case for Expanding Direct Liability  
Here I explore the possibility that, as an alternative to expanding the 
scope for strict-vicarious liability, direct negligence liability could be 
tweaked specifically to allow for more flexibility in terms of widening the 
range (and imagination) of preventative measures considered by the 
courts.130  Or, punitive damages could be added on top of existing 
negligence liability to address under-detection.131 
a. Expanding Direct Negligence Claims 
An alternative way to address, directly, the courts’ extremely narrow 
interpretation of direct negligence liability and, indirectly, the under-
detection issue would be to lower the burden on plaintiffs to establish 
direct negligence liability to include a more flexible notion of preventative 
measures.132  In other words, negligence-based direct liability might give 
enough flexibility to courts without resorting to strict liability to take up 
the slack. 
                                                
129 Sexual misconduct in the educational context has been “long documented to be 
widespread and prevalent in the United States.”  Catharine A. MacKinnon, In Their Hands:  
Restoring Institutional Liability for Sexual Harassment in Education, 125 YALE L.J. 2038, 2042 
(2016) (“Sexual harassment in education, which includes rape and other sexual assault, is a 
recognized form of gender-based violence long documented to be widespread and prevalent 
in the United States.” (citing, inter alia, Charol Shakeshaft, Educator Sexual Misconduct:  A 
Synthesis of Existing Literature, U.S. DEP’T EDUC. (2004), http://www2.ed.gov/ 
rschstat/research/pubs/misconductreview/report.pdf [https://perma.cc/7GE3-ZCJ9] 
(documenting an alarming incidence of teacher-on-student and other adult-on-student 
sexual misconduct and abuse in all levels of public schools))).  See also Charol Shakeshaft, 
Know the Warning Signs of Educator Sexual Misconduct, PHI DELTA KAPPAN 8, 9 (Feb. 2013), 
https://filestore.scouting.org/filestore/nyps/2013/pdf/Shakeshaft-Kappan20138.full.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8WCB-CSWR].   
130 See infra Section IV.B.2.a.   
131 See infra Section IV.B.2.b.   
132 Below, I also introduce a novel burden-shifting framework in the context of avoidance 
of punitive damages.  See infra Section IV.B.3. 
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Several courts have acknowledged the need for some flexibility 
inherent in the negligence standard in the institutional liability setting.  
Thus, for example, courts have adjusted the degree and even necessity for 
background checks based on the likely contact the employee will have 
with the public.133  In a similar vein, courts have considered potential 
preventative measures that go beyond background checks and screening 
employees based on past actions.  Consider, for example, Hicks ex rel. 
Nolette, a New York case in which a fourteen-year-old was sexually 
assaulted while residing at a youth detention facility.134  The court 
dismissed the vicarious liability and negligent hiring causes of action 
against the facility but allowed the claims of negligent training and 
supervision to proceed.135  Even though the plaintiff had to identify the 
untaken precautions, the court applied a far-reaching inquiry into the 
reasonableness of the facility’s actions.  To begin, the court credited the: 
record testimony [that] indicate[d] that defendant 
provided staff members, including Williams [the alleged 
assaulter], with written training manuals regarding 
proper interaction with troubled youth, including 
instructions on maintaining adequate interpersonal 
boundaries.  The facility director stated that she 
attempted to hold staff meetings “on a regular basis” to 
review the facility’s programmatic goals, and Williams 
similarly testified that he was subject to regular 
assessments by supervisory staff.136 
But the court then probed the extent of these measures, finding that:  
(1) “there was a general reluctance on the part of several staff members to 
report policy violations to supervisors or register complaints regarding 
staff conduct”; (2) “[o]ther complaints to supervisors regarding Williams’ 
improper conduct appear to have gone unaddressed”; and (3) defendant 
did not test or otherwise ensure that its staff members were 
                                                
133 See, e.g., Kirlin v. Halverson, 758 N.W.2d 436, 447–53 (S.D. 2008) (“[W]here job 
requirements bring an employee into frequent contact with the public, or individuals who 
have special relationships with the employer, the inquiry required expands beyond the job 
application and personal interview to an investigation of the applicant/employee’s 
background.”); Connes v. Molalla Transp. Sys., Inc., 831 P.2d 1316, 1321–22 (Colo. 1992) 
(“The scope of the employer’s duty in exercising reasonable care in a hiring decision will 
depend largely on the anticipated degree of contact which the employee will have with other 
persons in performing his or her employment duties.”).  
134 Hicks ex rel. Nolette v. Berkshire Farm Ctr. Servs. Youth, 999 N.Y.S.2d 879, 881 (App. 
Div. 2014). 
135 Id. at 881–82. 
136 Id. at 881. 
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knowledgeable and compliant with its written policies and instructional 
materials.137 
In another case, Foradori v. Harris, the Fifth Circuit noted that an 
employer could be liable for negligent supervision when it took “a rather 
passive managerial approach” that avoided directly asking employees 
about an assault that occurred during business hours and failed to 
“adequately inform [the employee] of the adverse consequences which 
would result if he behaved in a violent manner towards a customer.”138  
Among the actions the employer could have taken to avoid liability for the 
employee’s intentional tort were:  (1) “steps to train and discipline its 
employees to take reasonable precautions to control and defuse customer-
related altercations on its premises”; and (2) adequate training of 
managers to comply with work rules and manuals that gave instructions 
for how to deal with employee misconduct.139   
A New Jersey court likewise took an expansive view of employer 
direct negligence liability by recognizing a corporation’s duty to monitor 
employee usage of office computers in order to prevent the uploading of 
child pornography.140  Relying on Restatement § 317, the court found that 
the employer “was under a duty to exercise reasonable care to stop [its 
e]mployee’s activities,” which federal lawmakers determined constituted 
a threat to children forced to engage in such activities.141  Specifically, the 
court held that “defendant had a duty to report [e]mployee’s activities to 
the proper authorities and to take effective internal action to stop those 
activities, whether by termination or some less drastic remedy.”142   
                                                
137 Id. at 882. 
138 Foradori v. Harris, 523 F.3d 477, 493 (5th Cir. 2008). 
139 Id. 
140 See Doe v. XYC Corp., 887 A.2d 1156, 1167–68 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) 
(discussing the duty to monitor usage of company computers).  
141 Id.  
142 Id.  The court’s recognition of a fairly expansive set of preventative measures that 
should have been taken was, nonetheless, in a case in which the court had no difficulty 
finding that the employer was sufficiently on notice of the specific risk posted by its 
employee:   
[D]efendant was on notice of Employee’s pornographic related 
computer activity by early 2000.  By late March 2001, defendant had 
knowledge, through its supervisory personnel, that Employee had 
visited a variety of “porn sites” including one that suggested child 
pornography.  Yet, despite being reported to high level management, no 
action was taken.  A reasonable fact-finder could conclude that an 
appropriate investigation at that time would have revealed the extent of 
Employee’s activities and, presumably, would have led to action to shut 
down those activities.   
Id. at 1169. 
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Thus, while there are manifold cases in which the employer’s lack of 
knowledge of the precise risk of the employee’s intentional tort is an 
insuperable barrier to recovery, in others, courts have exercised discretion 
and considered fairly wide-ranging potential precautions the employer 
could take to reduce the likelihood of harm. 
b. Adding Punitive Damages  
Moreover, if the risk of under-detection is significant, punitive 
damages can also be awarded in cases of direct employer negligence 
liability.  Because Restatement § 317 imposes direct liability on an employer 
for its own negligence, punitive damages may be justified under 
Restatement § 908.143 
In Hutchison ex rel. Hutchison v. Luddy, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court held that punitive damages could be awarded against employers 
found liable in § 317 direct negligence claims.144  The court applied its 
traditional direct punitive damages analysis, motivated by the primary 
concern of deterring future outrageous conduct.145  Moreover, the court 
made clear that “[p]unitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is 
outrageous, because of the defendant’s evil motive or his reckless 
indifference to the rights of others.”146 
The court noted:   
It may be that, as a practical matter, it proves more 
difficult to sustain a claim for punitive damages against 
the “master” in the negligent supervision context than it 
might be with other negligence-based torts, given that the 
more direct harm (which, as here, may well involve an 
                                                
143 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (explaining when 
punitive damages are justified).  
144 Hutchison ex rel. Hutchison v. Luddy, 870 A.2d 766, 773 (Pa. 2005) (“We see no 
reason . . . to distinguish between claims sounding under Section 317 and other actions 
sounding in negligence for purposes of punitive damages.”). 
145 Id. at 771 (“The only purpose of punitive damages is to deter outrageous conduct.”).   
146 Id. at 770 (emphasis added) (first quoting Feld v. Merriam, 485 A.2d 742, 747 (Pa. 1984); 
and then quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1979)).  Here, I 
take “reckless indifference” to open up room for the award of non-retributive societal 
damages.  See Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, supra note 111, at 369.  
Admittedly, this may stretch what the court had in mind.  The court noted that because 
punitive damages are intended to punish the tortfeasor for outrageous conduct and to deter 
him and others like him from similar conduct in the future, “The state of mind of the actor is 
vital. The act, or the failure to act, must be intentional, reckless or malicious.”  Hutchison, 870 
A.2d at 770.  See also id. (“[P]unitive damages are penal in nature and are proper only in cases 
where the defendant’s actions are so outrageous as to demonstrate willful, wanton or 
reckless conduct.”). 
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intentional tort) will usually have been inflicted directly 
by the “servant.”  But, that is a matter for proof that 
attends the particular case; there is no general 
proscription in law against pursuing punitive damages in 
the Section 317 context, where the facts so warrant.147 
Several courts applying Pennsylvania law and Restatement § 908 have 
held that punitive damages may be awarded in § 317 negligent 
supervision cases.  In Reichert v. Pathway School, John Doe was repeatedly 
sexually abused by an older student, T.Y., on the premises of Pathway 
School.148  The plaintiff sued the school, alleging negligent supervision of 
the abusive older student.149  The court allowed punitive damages to 
proceed in the case, given that the plaintiff put forth sufficient facts to 
support a finding of the school’s “reckless indifference to John Doe’s 
safety.”150  And likewise in White v. Punita Group, Inc., punitive damages 
were allowed to go forward in a case in which the plaintiff alleged the 
employer was reckless or grossly negligent for failing to exercise 
reasonable care in hiring, training, and supervising an employee.151  In 
that case, defendant Punita Group sent its employee to a gun show 
without supervision or training on “handl[ing] firearms and ammunition 
despite the fact that his job required handling both items.”152 
                                                
147 Hutchison, 870 A.2d at 773 (emphasis omitted). 
148 Reichert v. Pathway Sch., 935 F. Supp. 2d 808, 812 (E.D. Pa. 2013). 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 825.  Admittedly, the court elaborated factors evincing “reckless indifference” that 
seem to approximate “reprehensibility” under the circumstances, especially given the 
school’s fiduciary relationship to students.  According to the court: 
These facts relate to violations of school policies, the physical 
circumstances surrounding the sexual acts, and [the school’s] 
understanding of the behaviors of John Doe and T.Y.  Of particular note 
is the fact that T.Y.’s disciplinary record reflected over one hundred 
discipline citations, including incidents of a sexual nature and 
numerous elopements.  In addition, many of the sexual encounters 
occurred over a period of up to thirty minutes and took place in a 
bathroom located a few feet away from John Doe’s classroom. 
Id. 
151 White v. Punita Grp., Inc., No. 1:15-CV-1195, 2016 WL 1117476, at *5 (E.D. Va. Mar. 18, 
2016).   
152 Id.  The court concluded: “It is too early to determine where Punita Group’s alleged 
conduct falls on the spectrum between negligence and reckless indifference.  At this stage, 
Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled a claim for punitive damages.  Whether it remains viable will 
depend on discovery.”  Id. at *6. 
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3. The Weak Case for Vicarious Liability Punitive Damages and a Novel 
Burden-Shifting Approach 
As we have just seen, one strategy for addressing significant under-
detection in the institutional liability context is to recognize punitive 
damages on top of direct negligence liability.153  But, if instead, strict-
vicarious liability is imposed (as opposed to direct negligence) to address 
under-detection, then the case for imposing punitive damages vicariously 
is comparatively weaker.  Thus, through the lens of under-detection, 
vicarious liability serves as a quasi-substitute for punitive damages. 
This view of vicarious liability as a quasi-substitute for punitive 
damages could lend support to the courts’ enforcement of a doctrinal 
dividing line between vicarious and direct employer liability—albeit not 
based on “scope of employment” but instead on avoidance of over-
deterrence in situations in which vicarious liability has been imposed 
when plaintiff could not identify specific untaken precautions (or meet the 
heightened threshold knowledge requirement) in an institutional context 
where the risk of under-detection is significant.  Nonetheless, it is not clear 
that the choice of the type of liability should rest with the defendant.  
Given the “scope of employment” doctrinal dividing line, an employer 
might have a strategic incentive to concede that its employee’s actions fall 
within the “scope of employment” so as to foreclose a direct liability claim 
that could be combined with punitive damages.  Courts might respond in 
such a circumstance by shifting the burden to the defendant to 
demonstrate that it has suitable preventative measures in place. 
The “pure” vicarious liability punitive damages rule—recognized in 
some jurisdictions—recognizes punitive damages so long as the employee 
acts within the scope of employment.154  In other words, it extends strict-
                                                
153 See supra Section IV.B.2.b.  
154 See, e.g., Potomac Leasing Co. v. Bulger, 531 So. 2d 307, 311 (Ala. 1988) (reaffirming the 
scope of employment rule in the face of a challenge based on the Restatement’s complicity 
rule); J.B. Hunt Transp. v. Doss, 899 S.W.2d 464, 469 (Ark. 1995) (reaffirming longstanding 
scope of employment rule); Wiper v. Downtown Dev. Corp. Tucson, 372 P.2d 200, 201 (Ariz. 
1987) (“Arizona has specifically rejected the Restatement view in favor of a rule allowing 
punitive damages against an employer for acts of its employees ‘so long as committed in the 
furtherance of the employer’s business and acting within the scope of employment.’”); 
Goddard v. Grand Trunk Ry., 57 Me. 202, 224 (1869) (adopting the scope of employment rule 
for corporations as well as individual employers); Embry v. Holly, 442 A.2d 966, 969–71 (Md. 
1982) (declining to adopt the Restatement rule favoring a broad scope of employment for 
holding an employer vicariously liable for punitive damages); Ray v. Detroit, 242 N.W.2d 
494, 496 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976) (affirming the scope of employment rule); Tietjens v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., 418 S.W.2d 75, 88 (Mo. 1967) (same); Bierman v Aramark Refreshment Servs., 
198 P.3d 877, 884 (Okla. 2008) (declining to adopt Restatement rule); Beauchamp v. Winnsboro 
Granite Corp., 101 S.E. 856, 858–59 (S.C. 1920) (articulating the scope of employment rule); 
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vicarious liability to punitive damages without requiring ratification or 
authorization by the employer.  The rule has been defended on deterrence 
grounds “especially in the case of corporations, who can only act through 
their agents.”155  As one court reasoned, “if such damages will encourage 
employers to exercise closer control over their servants for the prevention 
of outrageous torts, that is sufficient ground for awarding them.”156  
But critics, most notably William Curtis, have resisted the theory:   
[E]ven if it is assumed that an employer should be liable 
for all the acts of his employees in the scope of their 
duties, there is nothing to indicate that employers are 
generally aware of such liability, or that considerations of 
liability have any more effect upon hiring practices than 
do ordinary business considerations.  This broad rule of 
liability could, however, significantly increase a 
plaintiff’s chances of a larger recovery, since it is generally 
easier to establish liability when no voluntary act is 
required other than the initial hiring of the employee.  A 
sizeable judgment for punitive damages, however, does 
not necessarily mean that the policy of holding employers 
responsible for their employees’ conduct has had the 
intended effect.  The prudent employer will insure 
against such losses, add the cost of the premiums to his 
cost of doing business, and thereby transfer the risk to the 
ultimate consumer of his product.157  
It is not necessarily the case, however, that the insurability of vicarious 
liability punitive damages thwarts the deterrence cost-internalization 
mechanism.  To the extent that insurance can play a risk-management 
role—providing oversight of institutional and employer policies 
regarding hiring, training, and supervising employees—then the 
deterrence function persists.  Insurance companies can also engage in 
experience rating of their premia to further bolster the deterrence effect.  
Moreover, the very fact that states allow for insurability of vicarious 
liability punitive damages (even some states that foreclose insurance for 
direct punitive damages as against public policy) signals (at least an 
                                                
Odom v. Gray, 508 S.W.2d 526, 533 (Tenn. 1974) (affirming a lower court decision which 
reaffirmed the longstanding scope of employment rule). 
155 Stroud v. Denny’s Rest., Inc., 532 P.2d 790, 793 n.2 (Or. 1975) (quoting PROSSER ON TORTS 
12, § 2 (4th ed. 1971)). 
156 Id. 
157 Curtis, supra note 120, at 847 (footnote omitted). 
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implicit) embrace of the deterrent (non-retributive) function of punitive 
damages in this area.158 
But—as we have seen—if the justification for imposing strict-
vicarious liability on the employer is to mitigate the risk of under-
detection and thus enhance deterrence,159 then the imposition of strict 
liability punitive damages (at least on the grounds of under-detection) 
would over-deter.  However, before allowing a defendant to immunize 
itself from punitive damages by, for example, conceding vicarious liability 
(i.e., stipulating that its employee acted “within the scope of 
employment,” no matter how much of a stretch), it is worth considering 
whether courts should impose some affirmative burden on the defendant 
to come forward with evidence that it has preventative precautionary 
measures in place. 
This novel burden-shifting approach would be information-forcing in 
the sense that evidence of the institutional culture and precautionary 
preventative measures are likely to be within the exclusive control of the 
employer.  Under this scheme, the employer must demonstrate to the 
court that it has such preventative measures in place in order to avoid 
negligence-based liability that could serve as a predicate for the 
imposition of punitive damages. 
As far as I know, no court has applied such a burden-shifting 
approach.  Instead, as described above, the courts’ approach to the “scope 
of employment” as a doctrinal dividing line between vicarious liability 
claims and direct negligence has been theoretically justified, if at all, on 
enterprise causation grounds.  There is an analogous information-forcing 
affirmative defense imposed on employers in the Title VII vicarious 
liability sexual harassment context.160  But whereas in the Title VII context 
the employer’s setting forth of preventative policies in place would 
constitute an affirmative defense to the strict liability claim, the burden-
shifting paradigm I am proposing here would not immunize the employer 
from strict-vicarious liability but instead only foreclose the addition of 
direct negligence claims and punitive damages. 
                                                
158 For discussion of the insurability of punitive damages generally, as well as in the 
context of vicarious liability punitive damages, see Catherine M. Sharkey, Revisiting the 
Noninsurable Costs of Accidents, 64 MD. L. REV. 409 (2005). 
159 See supra Part IV.A (discussing under-detection as a basis for imposing strict-vicarious 
liability on employers).  
160 See, e.g., Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 545–46 (1999) (holding that, where 
an employer engages in a good-faith effort to comply with Title VII, it cannot be held liable 
for punitive damages). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 53, No. 1 [], Art. 2
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol53/iss1/2
2018] Employees’ Intentional Torts 41 
4. The Efficiency Case for the Restatement’s Punitive Damages 
“Complicity Rule”  
Restatement § 909 (“Punitive Damages Against A Principal”) marked 
a departure from an approach of strict-vicarious liability for punitive 
damages incurred as a result of an employee tort committed within the 
scope of employment, to a fault-based rule requiring some complicity in 
the wrongful act by the employer.161  States that allow punitive damages 
are roughly evenly divided on whether to allow for “pure” vicarious 
liability for punitive damages as opposed to a more restrictive 
“complicity” rule, requiring some element of fault on the part of the 
employer.162   
Restatement § 909 provides: 
Punitive damages can properly be awarded against a 
master or other principal because of an act by an agent if, 
but only if[:]  (a) the principal or a managerial agent 
authorized the doing and the manner of the act[;] or 
(b) the agent was unfit and the principal or a managerial 
agent was reckless in employing or retaining him[;] or 
(c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and 
was acting in the scope of employment[;] or (d) the 
principal or a managerial agent of the principal ratified or 
approved the act.163 
Known as the “complicity rule,” § 909 is a kind of hybrid falling between 
the poles of the pure vicarious liability rule and no vicarious liability rule, 
but designed to limit the scope of the pure vicarious liability rule. 
                                                
161 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (detailing when 
punitive damages can be assessed against a principal).  
162 See Briner v. Hyslop, 337 N.W.2d 858, 863 (Iowa 1983) (“Of the fifty states and the 
District of Columbia, twenty-two states follow either the Restatement or a more restrictive 
rule; twenty states follow the course of employment rule; four states do not allow punitive 
damages; four states have not addressed the issue; and the rule in Iowa is in question.”).  See 
also Michael F. Sturley, Vicarious Liability for Punitive Damages, 70 LA. L. REV. 501, 513 (2010) 
(“[T]he majority rule (or at least the plurality rule) may be that the normal respondeat 
superior standard for tort liability also applies to the imposition of punitive damages, 
meaning that an employer can be liable in punitive damages for the misconduct of any 
employee acting in the scope of his or her employment—without any complicity 
whatsoever.” (footnote omitted)). 
163 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 (AM. LAW INST. 1979).  Section 909 also requires 
that the underlying act of the employee “must be of a character subjecting the agent to 
liability for exemplary damages before the master can be held vicariously liable for such 
damages.”  Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Marvin Riggs Co., 584 S.W.2d 863, 867 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1979). 
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a. Fairness Justification 
The Restatement complicity approach was motivated by—and is 
typically justified on account of—fairness or morality considerations.  
While the employer is not required to have acted with willful disregard or 
wantonness to be liable for punitive damages, Restatement § 909 arose 
from fairness concerns, “which make it improper ordinarily to award 
punitive damages against one who himself is personally innocent and 
therefore liable only vicariously.”164  As Clarence Morris wrote in 1960, the 
complicity rule “wisely protects corporations from vicarious liability for 
punitive damages when a properly supervised and disciplined employee 
acts outrageously; and it wisely allows for punitive damages awards 
against some corporations whose institutional conscience should be 
aroused.”165  The Supreme Court of Iowa has likewise embraced the 
Restatement rule as:   
more consistent with the purpose of punitive damages 
than is the course of employment rule.  Although there 
are arguments in favor of the course of employment rule, 
the weakening of the deterrence effect, the increase in the 
cost of legitimate activities, and the injustice of punishing 
the innocent, all outweigh whatever benefits the course of 
employment rule might present.166 
b. Efficiency Justification 
On occasion, courts have justified the Restatement § 909 complicity 
rule on deterrence grounds:   
To the extent that it appears that a corporation might have 
been able to prevent wrongful conduct by an employee, 
the corporation should be liable for punitive damages.  
Indeed, the threat of punitive damages should be an 
incentive to the corporation to take precautions with its 
employees.  If, on the other hand, the corporation could 
have done nothing to prevent the employee’s wrongful 
                                                
164 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 909 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1979).  See also Enright v. 
LuBow, 493 A.2d 1288, 1301 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) (adopting the Restatement rule 
on fairness grounds “based on the notion that it would be improper ordinarily to award 
punitive damages against one who is personally innocent and therefore liable only 
vicariously”). 
165 Clarence Morris, Punitive Damages in Personal Injury Cases, 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 216, 222 
(1960) (emphasis added). 
166 Briner, 337 N.W.2d at 867 (emphasis added). 
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conduct, punitive damages can have little deterrent effect, 
either to that corporation or as an example to other 
employers.  This distinction is recognized by the 
complicity rule which in assessing punitive damages for 
reckless hiring or retaining of an unfit employee provides 
an incentive for taking care in selecting and training 
personnel.167 
Less well recognized is the fact that Restatement § 909 provides a very 
broad definition of complicity, “extend[ing] employer liability to 
employee conduct which it would be difficult to show was authorized, but 
for which the employer is at least partially blameworthy because he 
employed an unfit person.”168  But “blameworthy” may overstate the case.  
                                                
167 Id. at 865–66.  See also Dahl v. Sittner, 474 N.W.2d 897, 903 (S.D. 1991) (characterizing 
the Restatement approach as focusing on deterrence, specifically § 909(b), which “in assessing 
punitive damages for reckless hiring or retaining of an unfit employee provides an incentive 
for taking care in selecting and training personnel”). 
168 Briner, 337 N.W.2d at 866.  Several states, however, have explicitly rejected liability on 
this basis (namely, hiring an unfit employee), insisting instead that the principal must have 
participated in, authorized, or ratified its agent’s acts.  See, e.g., Jenkins v. Whittaker Corp., 
551 F. Supp. 110, 112 (D. Haw. 1982) (“Punitive damages may be recovered against a 
corporate defendant only if the corporation expressly or impliedly authorized or ratified the 
tortious act of its agent.”); Hatfield v. Max Rouse & Sons Nw., 606 P.2d 944, 957 (Idaho 1980) 
(“It is well established in Idaho that punitive damages may not be assessed against a 
principal based on the acts of an agent absent a clear showing that the agent had managerial 
status or that the principal ordered or ratified the acts in question.”); Openshaw v. Oregon 
Auto. Ins. Co., 487 P.2d 929, 32 (Idaho 1971) (“To be entitled to an award of punitive damages 
against a corporation the complaining party must show that the principal . . . participated in 
or authorized or ratified the agent’s acts.”); Brashear v. Packers, 883 P.2d 1278, 1280 (N.M. 
1994) (“The long-standing rule in New Mexico is that an employer is liable in punitive 
damages for the acts of its employee only in cases in which the employer ‘has authorized, 
participated in[,] or ratified the acts of the employee.’”); Albuquerque Concrete Coring Co. 
v. Pan Am World Servs., 879 P.2d 772, 775 (N.M. 1994) (“It is a well-established rule in New 
Mexico that a principal may be held liable for punitive damages when the principal has in 
some way authorized, ratified, or participated in the wanton, oppressive, malicious, 
fraudulent, or criminal acts of its agent.”); AAA Pool Serv. & Supply v. Aetna Casualty & 
Sur. Co., 479 A.2d 112, 116 (R.I. 1984) (requiring that the principal have participated in, 
ratified, or authorized a tortious act before punitive damages may be imposed).  See also KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 60-3701(d)(1) (Westlaw through 2018) (“In no case shall exemplary or punitive 
damages be assessed . . . against:  (1) [a] principal or employer for the acts of an agent or 
employee unless the questioned conduct was authorized or ratified by a person expressly 
empowered to do so on behalf of the principal or employer.”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 411.184(3) (Westlaw through 2018) (“In no case shall punitive damages be assessed against 
a principal or employer for the act of an agent or employee unless such principal or employer 
authorized or ratified or should have anticipated the conduct in question.”); Saint Joseph 
Healthcare, Inc. v. Thomas, 487 S.W.3d 864, 873 (Ky. 2016) (clarifying that, under Kentucky 
statute § 411.184(3), punitive damages may not be granted against an employer for conduct 
of an employee “unless the offensive conduct was 1) authorized by the employer; 2) 
anticipated by the employer; or 3) ratified by the employer”). 
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There is no explicit requirement that the employer’s act be sufficiently 
reprehensible to meet the given state’s punitive damages standard.169  
Section 909(b) requires employers to have been “reckless” in hiring an 
unfit individual.170  And some states employ a standard nearly 
indistinguishable from negligence.171   
We are now ready to appreciate that the Restatement’s complicity rule 
for punitive damages can be justified not only on fairness grounds but also 
from an efficiency perspective.  Punitive damages per § 909(b) 
(“reckless[ly]” employ “unfit” agent) are thus akin to punitive damages 
under § 908 with direct negligence liability as a predicate (at least where 
states have interpreted “recklessly” as akin to “negligently”).172  Punitive 
damages on top of direct negligence liability, moreover, can be 
theoretically justified by the risk of under-detection and under-deterrence.  
                                                
169 See, e.g., Mercury Motors Express, Inc. v. Smith, 393 So. 2d 545, 549 (Fla. 1981) 
(“Although the misconduct of the employee, upon which the vicarious liability of the 
employer for punitive damages is based, must be willful and wanton, it is not necessary that 
the fault of the employer, independent of his employee’s conduct, also be willful and wanton.  
It is sufficient that the plaintiff allege and prove some fault on the part of the employer which 
foreseeably contributed to the plaintiff’s injury to make him vicariously liable for punitive 
damages.”). 
170 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
171 See, e.g., Holland Furnace Co. v. Robson, 402 P.2d 628, 631 (Colo. 1965) (holding that a 
corporation can be held vicariously liable for punitive damages where it “failed to exercise 
proper care in selecting its servants”) (emphasis added); Mercury Motors Express, Inc., 393 So. 
2d at 548 (noting that punitive damages against the employer were “justified . . . because the 
plaintiff alleged and proved not only willful, wanton, or outrageous conduct on the part of 
the employee but also negligence on the part of the employer which contributed to the 
plaintiff’s injury” (emphasis added)); Gray v. Allison Div., Gen. Motors Corp., 370 N.E.2d 
747, 752 (Ohio Ct. App. 1977) (“It is well established in Ohio that punitive damages may not 
be recovered against a corporation in the absence of evidence that the corporation . . . was 
negligent in the selection of its employees.” (emphasis added)). 
 Other states, however, employ a more stringent standard than recklessness.  See, e.g., 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(b) (Westlaw through 2018) (“An employer shall not be liable for 
[punitive] damages . . . based upon acts of an employee of the employer, unless the employer 
had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a 
conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others . . . .”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20 subd. 
2(2) (Westlaw through 2018) (“Punitive damages can properly be awarded against a master 
or principal because of an act done by an agent only if . . . (2) the agent was unfit and the 
principal deliberately disregarded a high probability that the agent was unfit  . . . .”); NEV. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 42.007(1)(a) (Westlaw through 2017) (stating that an employer is only 
vicariously liable for punitive damages if “[t]he employer had advance knowledge that the 
employee was unfit for the purposes of the employment and employed the employee with a 
conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others”).  See also Countrywide Home Loans, 
Inc. v. Thitchener, 192 P.3d 243, 255 (Nev. 2008) (noting that “conscious disregard” under the 
Nevada statute requires more culpability than recklessness). 
172 See, e.g., Bryant v. Livigni, 619 N.E.2d 550, 557 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (reasoning that 
§ 909(b) liability is based upon “the wrongful conduct of the employer itself,” not on a 
vicarious liability theory). 
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Moreover, with respect to the imposition of vicarious liability punitive 
damages, the Restatement’s complicity rule mitigates the risk of over-
deterrence by requiring some degree of employer fault (i.e., “authorized” 
per § 909(a); or “ratified or approved” per § 909(d)).173  Finally, it limits the 
pure vicarious “scope of employment” liability to agents acting in 
“managerial capacity” per § 909(c).174 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The overall reluctance to find institutional liability for employees’ 
intentional torts may have fueled the doctrinal puzzle whereby “scope of 
employment” has emerged as a dividing line between employer vicarious 
liability and direct negligence liability.  Perhaps the courts’ attempts to 
narrow the scope of vicarious liability and negligence causes of action, 
respectively, have led to further confusion whereby such causes of action 
are also treated as mutually exclusive, characterized by which side of the 
“scope of employment” line the employee’s intentional tort falls.175 
But unpacking this doctrinal puzzle is only the prelude to the wider 
ambition of my Article, which is to reconsider the choice between 
alternative institutional liability approaches.  In particular, with a 
renewed focus on the under-detection of employer preventative 
measures, I have set forth a framework for reassessing the comparative 
strength of different forms of institutional liability, namely strict-vicarious 
liability and direct negligence theories, with or without the imposition of 
punitive damages. 
Several key insights follow from this framework.  If employer 
vicarious liability is imposed at least in part for under-detection of 
preventative measures, then perhaps vicarious liability should be 
considered as a quasi-substitute for punitive damages in direct liability 
situations, likewise imposed for under-detection purposes.  Such 
recognition would simultaneously strengthen the case for punitive 
damages in direct negligence (§ 317) claims and weaken the case for 
vicarious liability punitive damages.  Moreover, Restatement § 909—
typically defended as a “complicity rule” limiting the imposition of 
vicarious-punitive liability on fairness grounds—is justified on economic 
deterrence grounds by allowing punitive damages coupled with direct 
negligence liability but limiting its operation in the vicarious liability 
sphere. 
                                                
173 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909(a), (d) (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
174 Id. § 909(c). 
175 Cf. Feldthusen, supra note 128, at 224 (“[O]nce intentional employee wrongdoing is in 
issue, some inexplicable doctrinal slippage occurs.”). 
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